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Abstract:
Firms must continuously strive to grow through the creation of new sources of
competitive advantage. The challenges to growth are more severe for large, established
firms that derive a predominant amount of their present revenue from technology that is
mature and that faces imminent substitution through the marketplace emergence of a
disruptive technology. In such circumstances, non-traditional growth, through new
business opportunities outside of the direct purview of established Strategic Business
Units, becomes an imperative.
The primary hypothesis of this study is that problems in achieving growth predominantly
stem from the inherent rigidities of large, established firms and, in order to successfully
grow, these firms will have to pay particular attention to the structures and processes
associated with teams tasked with growth. Accordingly, a theoretical frameworkfor
classifying non-traditional growth opportunities is developed. The study is motivated
using three examples of non-traditional growth projects in a large, established firm.
These examples are used to develop three key dimensions for characterizing such
opportunities - technology, market, and organization. The proposed framework builds
upon structural contingency theories to develop two independent factors for each
dimension - uncertainty and interdependence. A vector mapping applicable to all non-
traditional growth opportunities is developed using the two factors and three dimensions.
The vector mapping is used to propose a linkage between growth opportunity and
organizationalform.
A survey administered to 24 project leaders/managers of non-traditional growth projects
in a single, large firm is used to test the applicability of the framework developed here. A
statistical analysis of the survey results corroborates the significance of market and
technology factors. Organizational factors appear to be less significant, but this may be
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due to artifacts in the data. Finally, a concept explored in this study is that organizations
must become more ambidextrous in their ability to use multiple organizationalforms,
simultaneously, to exploit non-traditional growth opportunities. Implementation
considerations relevant to the recommended organizationalforms are discussed within
the specific product development process framework in a single, large firm.
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"The ability to learn faster than your competitors may be the only sustainable
competitive advantage."- Arie de Geus, Shell
Chapter 1: Introduction
A firm's resources are the source of rent creation. As such, in all but the most stable
environments, resources lose their ability to generate rent over time, which is due to
competition, obsolescence, etc. Firms must thus continuously strive to grow through the
creation of new sources of competitive advantage.(Wernerfelt 1984) It is not easy,
however, for a large, established firm to grow. The business literature over the last two
decades has documented in considerable detail the typical evolution of a firm from a
small, flexible, entrepreneurial entity with informal linkages and "system knowledge" to
a small, a medium, and, finally, a large, "rigid" corporation with formal linkages and
highly specialized component knowledge.(Utterback 1994; Christensen 1997) It has
become a cliche to speak of the conversion of core competencies into core
rigidities.(Leonard-Barton 1992) However, despite the extensive documentation of the
difficulties of achieving growth in large, established corporations, the fact remains that
the continued survival of large, established companies substantially depends upon
consistently achieving meaningful growth.
The challenges to growth are more severe for a company that derives a predominant
amount of its present revenues from technology that is mature and faces the imminent
emergence of a disruptive technology. Eastman Kodak Company derives about two-
thirds of current annual revenues of $12.8B from silver halide-imaging photographic
products. Digital imaging, as a technology, has developed sufficiently to be able to
replace silver-halide imaging in most applications - offering the promise of acceptable
quality at lower cost and with higher convenience.(Utterback 1994; Christensen 1997)
Kodak has reacted strongly and aggressively in the face of the threat of digital imaging,
redefining itself as a leader in "Info-Imaging." Indeed, it is a pioneer in the digital
imaging technology field with a sizable intellectual property portfolio and a wide range
of products tailored to the digital imaging value chain. However, the digital imaging
business is substantially different from the traditional silver halide business primarily
because it is a much more competitive marketplace with participating companies ranging
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from consumer electronics giants, such as Sony, to computer technology giants, such as
HP and Microsoft, as well as innumerable smaller firms that specialize in offering a
solution to a single step in the digital imaging value chain.(Fine 1998) Wide industry
participation has resulted in much shorter product lifetimes and significantly smaller
margins, making revenue growth in this arena difficult. Kodak has expanded its offerings
and improved its capabilities in silver-halide imaging as well - aggressively managing
costs and investments while offering improved services. However, it is widely expected
that digital imaging will eventually replace silver-halide imaging in most photographic
applications, with the only remaining dispute being the speed with which technology
substitution occurs. In the face of this challenge, therefore, it is imperative for Kodak to
find alternate sources of revenue that will enable it to continue to grow through the
technology transition and beyond.
This study will focus on the challenges to growth in large, established firms such as
Eastman Kodak Company. Several previous studies have explored the pathways to
growth available to large firms. From an organizational strategy perspective,
Wheelwright and Clark (Wheelwright and Clark 1992) in their seminal work on product
development explain the need for development frameworks and aggregate project plans
that focus on a portfolio of projects. Sanderson and Uzimeri (Sanderson and Uzumeri
1995) studied Sony's development of personal stereo systems and showed how Sony was
able to successfully develop a product family strategy. Meyer and Lehnard (Meyer and
Lehnard 1997) address the need for, and relative success of, product platforms. From an
organizational behavior perspective, it is widely recognized that to be successful, large,
established firms must find a way to foster entrepreneurial flexibility and creativity while
maintaining their success in controlling and coordinating the skills and knowledge of the
existing organization. Henderson (Henderson 2003) suggests two key factors that enable
this with (a) a senior management team that is ambidextrous, and (b) a choice of
organizational form that is suitable to the specific problem that the firm is facing.
Advocates of contingency theory (Nadler, Gerstein et al. 1992; Donaldson 1995; Nadler
and Tushman 1997) have argued that competitive advantage is derived from a firm's
dynamic ability to reconfigure resources, both new and existing, in novel combinations
that adapt to competitive changes, while misfit between structure and contingency
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reduces organizational performance. In other words, strategy and organizational design
need to evolve in concert with their environment in real time to be effective.
In this study, I will view large, established firms as complex systems comprising a set of
inter-related parts that combine to perform tasks and functions that cannot be
accomplished by the individual parts alone and wherein changes in one part affect the
other parts. As complex systems, firms exhibit such properties as internal
interdependence, the capacity for feedback, and adaptation, which are difficult to analyze
fully from a view of a sub-set of an organization or from a single perspective of a firm.
Therefore, in the analysis of growth in large firms, I consider several analytical
perspectives, each of which provides insights and understanding into the working of the
firm as a whole. Specifically, growth in large firms is viewed from strategic,
organizational, and dynamic perspectives.
From a strategic perspective, corporate strategy, technology strategy, and marketing
strategy, together, combine to offer a rounded perspective of a firm's resources and how
these can be used as a source of competitive advantage. Corporate strategy provides us
with an understanding of the nature of resources and capabilities of a firm. The dynamic
nature of technological change has strong impacts on a firm and its competitive
environment. Technology strategy provides us with an understanding of the firm's
effectiveness to creating, capturing, and delivering value by way of its products.
Marketing strategy provides us with an understanding of how the firm leverages its
products to achieve marketplace success.
From an organizational perspective, organizational design is the result of a strategic plan
and objectives set. Successful organizational design seeks to fashion a set of formal
structures and processes that, together with the appropriate informal structures and
processes, enables the organization to achieve its objectives most effectively.
Organizational theory is important insofar as managers must design organizations that
operate effectively under a given set of contingencies - which is changing
constantly.(Donaldson 1995)
From a dynamic perspective, organizations and their environments are complex systems
that are in a constant state of flux.(Sterman 2000) Complex systems are characterized by
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time-based effects and complicated, non-linear, feedback mechanisms. Failure to
properly understand and accommodate these dynamics, results in "policy resistance"
characterized by the inability of an organizational to adapt to its environment.
The combination of the above perspectives allows the treatment of growth initiatives
within an organization as a portfolio of development efforts.(Wheelwright and Clark
1992) While the business literature has, in general, begun recently to focus on whole
systems and processes rather than individual projects, it does not, however, contain much
guidance about how to put such thoughts into action. Simply recognizing product
development and business development as a complex system with interdependent
elements is of little help. In fact, a substantial body of research shows that human beings
perform poorly in decision-making tasks in dynamic environments.(Sterman 2000) In
order to further our understanding of such systems therefore, dynamic models are critical.
These models are developed using a system-architectural perspective of firms - with a
view that there is a mapping from organizational form to organizational function.
I distinguish between revenue growth in large, established firms through new revenue
opportunities in new businesses and revenue growth through extensions of existing
revenue streams. A very large body of existing literature, part of the standard curriculum
at every business school, focuses on the latter. However, large, established firms suffer
from a specific set of inertial forces that make revenue growth through new businesses
particularly challenging. I will focus on these forces and identify key strategic points of
leverage. Specifically, this study will use a system-architectural perspective to construct a
linkage between organizational form and growth in a large, established firm. This will be
done in three parts, as follows:
Part A: Literature Review -
(a) Firm analysis using three strategic lenses - corporate, technology, and marketing
(b) An analysis of the relationship between strategy and organizational structure
(c) A review of common organizational issues peculiar to large, established firms
(d) Frameworks for growth in large, established firms
Part B: Motivation -
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(e) A description of three key growth projects in a large, established firm
(f) This study's hypothesis: Large, established firms seeking new business growth
need to strategically, organizationally, and culturally embrace multiple-growth
modes and concomitant multiple organizational structures that match the relevant
growth modes.
(g) Analysis of the three key growth projects using the proposed framework
Part C: Empirical Study -
(a) Survey of 24 Project Leaders/Managers involved with new growth projects
(b) Survey results and analysis
(c) Conclusions and Recommendations for Implementation
(d) An analysis of the generic product development framework from the perspective
of new business growth
Appendix: System Dynamics Model -
(a) An introduction to system dynamics simulation models of firms
(b) Growth inhibition model - Project perspective and System perspective
(c) General model insights
Chapter 2 presents strategic and organizational perspectives of growth in a large,
established firm. The strategic perspective on growth is provided using three lenses -
corporate, technology, and marketing. The strategic perspective provides the framework
within which an organizational structures and executes growth plans. The organizational
perspective of the firm links organizational structure and processes to organizational
tasks. As a firm seeks to change or modify tasks, in this case engage in non-traditional
growth activities, organizational structures and processes need to evolve in lock step.
Organizational responses that drive growth are discussed and frameworks for growth
discussed in the literature are presented.
Chapter 3 presents the motivation for this study through a description and analysis of
three key growth projects in a large, established firm. Each project is analyzed using the
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strategic and organizational perspectives discussed previously. This analysis is used to
present the hypotheses for this study - a new framework for analyzing non-traditional
growth opportunities and the necessary linkages between organizational form and growth
opportunity. Each of the three growth projects presented previously is analyzed using the
suggested growth framework with concomitant linkage to organizational form.
Chapter 4 presents the results of a survey of 24 Project Leaders/Managers involved with
new business growth projects in a large, established firm. Survey results are analyzed and
used to test the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of this study. Implementation considerations are
discussed in some detail - addressing specifically structural, cultural, and dynamic issues,
as well as the implications of suggested changes on generic product development
processes.
Appendix A introduces system dynamics simulation models of firms. A system dynamics
model of "Growth inhibition" is presented from an individual and a system perspective.
Model results are summarized and conclusions discussed. Appendix B summarizes the
survey results and analysis.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
An analysis of non-traditional growth in large, established firms requires an
understanding of how a firm utilizes its resources as a source of competitive advantage.
In this chapter, I review the relevant literature on firm strategy from three perspectives:
corporate strategy, technology strategy, and marketing strategy. I also review the relevant
literature on organizational structure and structural contingency theory, to understand the
interplay between strategy and organization. Building upon this, I explore the inherent
rigidities and systemic antibodies that stand in the way of non-traditional growth in large,
established firms. Finally, I review the relevant literature on growth frameworks for
large, established firms.
2.1 The Strategic Perspectives of a Firm
2.1.1 The Corporate Strategy of a Firm:
A firm's resources and products, together, largely define its identity. Resources are
typically anything that can be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm,
including tangible assets such as production equipment, land, buildings, etc., and
intangible assets such as brand, know-how, and culture. The traditional concept of
corporate strategy is based upon the resource position of the firm characterizing its
strengths and weaknesses. More recently, the resource-based view of the firm has
developed two separate but related schools of thought.(Westerman 2002) The first school
emphasizes the role of firm-specific resources in promoting diversification and
innovation. The second school focuses on how firm-specific resources can provide
competitive advantage in a particular context. The intent in either case, however, is to
clearly establish the role of a firm's resources in value creation and value capture. To the
extent that the firm's resources are highly specific, differentiable, and of multiple use,
they can be used to generate higher value. Typically, however, resource advantages tend
to be ephemeral; firms must continuously search for new sources of competitive
advantage.
In the face of continuously changing environments, therefore, long-term competitive
advantage rests on the ability of the firm to adapt to such changes. Adaptation involves
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renewing existing assets as well as absorbing new assets along with unique combinations
of these adaptations. Resources are necessary but not sufficient. A body of literature in
this field is focused on the concept that there exists in each firm a core set of capabilities
that differentiate the firm strategically. Core capabilities (Leonard-Barton 1992) are best
defined as a set of differentiated skills, complementary assets, and routines that provide
the basis for a firm's competitive capacities and sustainable advantage in a particular
business. Insofar as the core capabilities are relevant in the face of changes in the
business environment, the firm enjoys a dominant technical depth; an understanding of
product and managerial systems and processes; and a key set of values and cultures that
improve its chances of success. However, in the face of radical changes in the business
environment, the same competencies become rigidities that display weaknesses, which
reflect strengths in the previous business climate - poor technical breadth, inability to
adjust to changing systems and processes, and cultures and values that are outdated.
A subsequent body of literature focused on the learning organization and the need for
dynamic organizational capabilities. These capabilities are defined as routines that enable
a firm to absorb new technologies, generate new knowledge, and integrate internal
resources. The ability to scan the environment and to integrate external technologies with
internal resources is deemed a more enduring competitive advantage than an
instantaneous resource position. Long-term competitive advantage comes from a firm's
dynamic ability to reconfigure resources, both new and existing, in novel combinations
that adapt to competitive changes. Indeed, consistent with the introduction of the fourth
generation R&D practices (Miller and Morris 1999), the interplay between knowledge
creation/organizational capability and organizational architecture is now the focal point
of attention.
2.1.2 The Technology Strategy of a Firm:
Given that this study is focused on the issues surrounding growth in a large, established,
technology-oriented firm, particularly one subject to disruptive technological change, I
begin with a description of pertinent literature focused upon disruptive change and the
difficulties incumbent, large firms face in attempting to grow in such challenging
environments.
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Technology S curves, graphs that plot the relationship between effort put into improving
a product or process and the results associated with that effort, have been extensively
used to map the maturity of technologies.(Foster 1986) Although somewhat stylistic,
nevertheless, S curves often provide a useful representation of the stage of evolution of a
technology set and the advent of competitive technologies for similar applications,
particularly when viewed in hindsight. Technology discontinuities are particularly
difficult transitions for incumbent, large firms. While relatively easy to spot, it is much
harder to actively invest in discontinuous technologies with the clear intention of
cannibalizing the incumbent older technology, as numerous examples over the past 50
years have repeatedly shown.
The Fosterian S-curve framework is complemented by Clayton Christensen's work on
disruptive technology.(Christensen 1997) Christensen describes disruptive innovations as
technologically straightforward innovations, often consisting of off-the-shelf components
put together in novel architectures, that actually perform poorer than the incumbent
technology in many key metrics but are able to distinguish themselves from the
incumbent technology in three key ways - (a) they show superior performance on at least
one dimension that meets a key customer need, (b) their performance on key attributes is
well within the "customer needs" trajectory and (c) they are substantially cheaper in at
least some dimensions than the cutting-edge incumbent technology. Aggressive,
customer-oriented, seemingly well-managed, incumbent organizations crumble in the
face of disruptive technology. Christensen explains that at least one source of this
dilemma is the fact that explicit demands from leading-edge customers have tremendous
power on the resource allocation process, directing resources repeatedly toward meeting
existing leading-edge customer needs that push the company to exceed the needs of a
majority of their customers. Indeed, often the needs met by the disruptive technology are
latent, making the justification of resources difficult within incumbent firms, resulting
ultimately in delayed market responses when disruptive technologies do, indeed, become
commercially mature. Incumbent firms appear to lose the ability to successfully confront
uncertainty, particularly in finding new applications for new products that are
peripherally similar to their own.
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Abernathy and Utterback (Utterback 1994) similarly found that firms evolve with their
technology to create highly specialized production infrastructures and processes that,
while extremely adept at incremental improvements, are unable to adapt to technologies
that require new or changed processes. Tushman and Anderson (Nadler and Tushman )
frame technology innovations as "competence-enhancing", those that enable incumbents
to evolve with the technology and "competence-destroying", those firms that require
skills, processes, and infrastructure that is radically different from those that exist
already. Henderson and Clark (Henderson and Clark 1990) present the dilemma of
architectural innovations, the reconfiguration of an existing system to link together
existing components in a new way, and how such innovations disrupt key communication
channels, information filters, and problem-solving strategies in managing architectural
knowledge. Since such communication channels, filters, and strategies are embedded in
the organization of established firms, these firms are often unable to make the transition
to a new orientation from one of refinement within a stable architecture to one of active
search for new solutions within a changing context. Attempts are often made to modify
existing channels, filters, and strategies rather than build new sets from scratch. It is
difficult to determine which strategies are to be changed and by how much, making such
attempts problem-fraught.
There is a clear linkage between the above literature and the core-competency concept
elucidated by Prahlad and Hamel (Prahlad and Hamel 1990) and Leonard-
Barton.(Leonard-Barton 1992) Core-competencies are those that differentiate a company
strategically and comprise a set of differentiated skills, complementary assets, and
routines that provide the basis for a firm's competitive capacities. These include
employee knowledge and skills, technical systems, managerial systems, values, and
norms. When taken in concert with the dynamics of innovation described by Utterback
(Utterback 1994), a firm, as it evolves over time from a fluid phase - characterized
primarily by product innovation, to a specific phase - characterized primarily by process
innovation, develops organizational structures, skills, and processes that embody the
communication channels, information filters, and problem-solving strategies utilized by
the firm. In striving continuously for higher efficiency in each of these transactions, the
organization evolves a set of core competencies that make it highly capable of dealing
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with the existing technology and business environment - these competencies are
institutionalized. When confronted eventually with a changing environment, the ability of
an organization to evolve with these changes is almost inversely related to the
efficiencies they attained in the previous environment. Higher efficiencies and greater
success in previous environments typically translate to lower adaptability.
Recognizing these disadvantages, recent literature has recognized the role of the
"learning organization" and the potential for the most defensible competitive advantage
being an organization's capacity to improve its existing skills and learn new ones.
William Miller and Langdon Morris, in their book titled "Fourth Generation R&D,"
(Miller and Morris 1999) explain that future growth for large, established companies
seeking to expand their top line, will become the fusion of new market knowledge and
new scientific and technical knowledge. Recognizing that large, established corporations
have a low tolerance for risk, Miller and Morris mention that these firms need a business
process focused on innovation rather than a business structure focused on more
traditional competencies of R&D, technology and product development, and marketing.
2.1.3 The Marketing Strategy of a Firm:
A marketing orientation to growth in large, established firms is focused on the choice of
the right product markets. Most managers agree with the basic precepts of revenue
segmentation - revenues are easier to capture in some product markets than others.
Typically, new customers are harder and more expensive to acquire than retained
customers. Also typically, new products are harder and more expensive to sell than
established products. The 2 x 2 matrix below segments products and markets into existing
and new.(Friedman and Furey 1999)
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Fig 2.1: Product Market Segmentation
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Growth of existing products in existing markets constitutes the low-hanging fruit, in
terms of growth. Improved market share and customer penetration typically provide the
most cost-effective path to revenue growth. The cost of acquiring new customers is
typically three to six times that of retaining existing ones. Accordingly, product markets
that require customer acquisition may be necessary for revenue growth but are typically
bad bets for short-term profitability. New product introductions similarly are costly.
Beyond development costs and failure rates, the cost-to-sell new products is substantially
higher than existing products because the sales force must be trained and the customer
base educated, forcing a larger sales cycle and requiring higher levels of support. Careful
screening, selection, and piloting of new products are critical to successful new product
introductions. Large, established firms in relatively mature industries typically consider it
risky and unprofitable to rely on new product sales for more than -25% of
revenue. (Friedman and Furey 1999) Product markets that are completely new to the
company are the highest risk ventures. Wary, new customers often will not buy untested
new products from a new vendor. The costs associated with finding new customers and
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introducing new products usually exceed any profits that may be realized from the
venture for several years. Companies pursuing this kind of growth typically do not target
more than 5 to 10% of their revenues from these types of sales.(Friedman and Furey
1999) In summary, successful market strategies involve: deeper penetration of existing
accounts with existing products, the selective acquisition of new customers with market-
validated products, and the selective introduction of well-screened offerings into the
installed base.
When the three strategic perspectives are taken together, a clear picture emerges. Large
firms, victims of past success, have stultified processes and methods that are unable to
adapt to changing market needs and/or changing technology. Recognizing this, firms
should restructure their processes to adapt better to disruptive changes, and they should
do so by "sticking to their knitting" - identifying and exploiting their core competencies
and markets while jettisoning any non-core pursuits. Unfortunately, since this is nothing
short of transforming the firm, this proves to be extremely difficult to do in practice. The
business literature does not clearly describe how the dynamics of organizational
architecture and organizational capability can be leveraged to achieve strategic
objectives. Typically, cultural and environmental aspects of each firm differ substantially
from other firms, even those within the same industry, making any recipe for business
transformation fraught with missteps. Indeed, firms that are confronted by disruptive
change may be forced to resort to high-risk strategies that look to new markets and new
products for revenue growth. I look beyond strategy, therefore, at the organizational
perspectives of a firm to better understand the details that may be relevant to achieve
organizational transformation.
2.2 An Organizational View of the Firm
When viewing a firm as a complex system, strategy and organization are closely linked.
Numerous organizational theories exist, but this study will focus on contingency theories
that emerged over 40 years ago, after attempts failed repeatedly to find the single-most
efficient organizational structure for all business environments. The central premise of
contingency theories is that there is no single best-way to organize - the design of an
organization should match the task contingencies facing it.
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The contingency approach was the outcome of research studies conducted by Tom Bums,
G.W. Stalker, John Woodward, Lawrence Lorsch, and others.(Donaldson 1995) Through
their analysis they correlated the structure of an organization to the surrounding
environmental conditions. In the 1950s, Bums and Stalker (Bums and Stalker 1961)
analyzed the environments and structures of several firms and identified two types of
organizational structures - Mechanistic and Organic, against two categories of
environment - Stable and Dynamic. Their studies revealed that mechanistic structures
were found to be common in organizations operating in stable environments, while
organizations operating in dynamic environments tended to be organic in structure.
Mechanistic structures include formal roles, strict hierarchy, concentrated power and
knowledge, and vertical communication, all characteristics of highly bureaucratic
organizations. Organic structures include less-formally defined roles, more discretion at
all levels, decentralized power and knowledge, and extensive horizontal communication,
typically the characteristics of organizations with high levels of task uncertainty.
Several different contingencies have since been identified, including size, strategy, and
technology, but these can all be interpreted through the lens of structural contingencies
that drive organizational design. Specifically, structural contingency theory advocates
that the organization fit its structure to the task contingency to yield operational
effectiveness - a better fit improves performance. The organizational structure may be
more participatory or more centralized as a function of - operational technology
(Woodward 1958); rate of environmental change and product diversity (Lawrence and J.
W. Lorsch 1967); size (Pugh and Hickson 1976); and strategy(Chandler 1962). As
primary and structural changes follow strategy change in time, organizational structure is
deemed secondary to strategy. Organizational management, as the main maker of both
strategic and structural decisions, is assumed to act rationally on behalf of the
organization. The time lag, while the organization is in misfit, is seen as arising from
incomplete knowledge by management. Driving misfit are two major contingencies -
uncertainty, which drives design and differentiation, and interdependence, which drives
the amount and type of integration.
Numerous attempts have been made to characterize and quantify uncertainty and
interdependence in organizations and organizational sub-units. The ideas that information
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processing underlies contingencies (such as uncertainty and diversity), and information-
processing needs give rise to the required organizational structures, have been developed
theoretically and empirically.(Galbraith 1974) Different tasks pose different information-
processing requirements. Different organization designs provide different types of
information-processing capacity. In order to increase organization performance,
information-processing requirements should be reduced, or information processing
capacity increased, until there is a fit between the information-processing capacity of the
organizational structure and the requirements imposed by the tasks at hand. Research has
also been undertaken on the critical issue of whether or not the fit between a given
contingency and a structural variable affects organizational performance, and there has
been an increasing tendency to examine multivariate models of more than one
contingency, structure, or performance variable.(Gresov 1989)
Despite the large body of literature and theories on contingency, however, there are three
main issues that remain to be addressed:
a) the subject of multiple contingencies and organizational responses to such
eventualities is only been touched upon,
b) the systemic comparison of one response versus another to the same set of
contingencies has not been examined, and
c) the theories are still primarily equilibrium-oriented - there is a strong need for
dynamic theories that allow a firm to maximize its effectiveness in the face of
constant uncertainty and change.
However, there has been considerable work on organization design, particularly with
respect to organization design for growth. In the next section, I review the primary
organizational structures for product development and growth-related activities.
2.3 Organizational Forms for Growth
While there exists a spectrum of growth options, including external development
(acquisitions, joint ventures, and corporate venturing) and internal development (internal
R&D, innovation teams, internal ventures), for reasons of alignment of incentives and
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priorities, as well as execution speed and capability, there exist improved efficiencies in
operation through specific organizational forms over other organizational forms.
Wheelwright and Clark (Wheelwright and Clark 1992) identified four dominant
structures around which product development activities are typically organized. These are
shown in Figure 2.2.
Fig 2.2 Team Structures
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The functional team structure is typically found in large, mature firms where people are
grouped together by discipline under the direction of a functional manager. The work of
the different functions is to coordinate ideas through a set of detailed specifications
agreed to by all parties at the start of the project and reinforced through periodic meeting.
Over time, the primary responsibility for the project passes sequentially through the
functional areas. The primary strengths of this approach are (a) managers that control
resources also control performance of project tasks making resource allocation within the
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sub-tasks less of an issue, (b) most career paths tend to be functional until one reaches a
general management level so career progression is less of an issue, and (c) specialized
expertise is brought to bear on key technical issues. However, there are several
weaknesses of this approach that make this form of structure particularly poor for growth
initiatives. These include (a) the neat division and sub-division of tasks into independent
activities at the onset of a complex development project is almost impossible, (b)
functional focus severely limits the perspective of the individuals, and (c) there is an over
emphasis on local optimization instead of system or sub-system optimization.
The lightweight team structure is another organizational form typically found in large,
mature firms. Like the functional structure, the team members physically reside in their
functional areas, but each functional organization provides a representative (or liaison) to
the project team. The project manager, who is typically chosen out of the function that is
most vested in the development process, has the responsibility for coordinating the
activities of the different functions. The project team members, however, remain under
the control of their respective functional managers; the project manager has no direct
power in reassigning people or reallocating resources. While this tends to be an
improvement over the functional team structure because there is a person who looks over
the entire project, nevertheless, power still resides within the functions, and as a
consequence, improved efficiency, speed, and quality over the functional team structures
are rarely observed.
Heavyweight project managers, in contrast, have direct access to, and responsibility for,
the work of those involved in the project. The core project group of heavyweight team
structures is often dedicated to the project and physically co-located. The assignments of
functional team members tend to last for the duration of the project with the members
returning to their functional homes after the project is complete. On the one hand, they
provide high levels of ownership and commitment among the core team members,
enabling tough issues to be addressed in a timely and effective fashion. Their singular
focus is often superior in tackling significant challenges. They are able to also effectively
address system solutions to customer needs. Conversely, such teams may get carried
away as they extend themselves and seek to redefine what needs to be done to achieve
success. There is often a constant challenge in balancing the resource needs of the
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individual project with those of the broader organization. There is also a question with
technical depth, as such teams typically seek less specialized solutions in an effort to
deliver a system. Heavyweight team structures typically tend to be more difficult to adopt
in large, mature firms. These teams often require fundamental changes in the way that
development works, and that responsibility has to be defined. In large, mature firms,
functional responsibilities tend be well defined and home turf fiercely defended. A
heavyweight team structure makes task responsibility definitions far more diffuse - the
team as whole feels ownership.
The autonomous team structure involves individuals from different functional areas that
are formally assigned, dedicated, and co-located to the project team. Removed from the
existing organization, the main advantage of this team structure is focus. Such teams tend
to do well at rapid, efficient new product and new process development. Cross-functional
integration is particularly effective. However, such teams typically are extremely difficult
to re-integrate into the mainstream organization. Their solutions tend to be unique, and
over time, they develop their own stand-alone culture.
From the descriptions given above, it is easily seen that functional and lightweight teams
are more effective in evolutionary development, whereas heavyweight and autonomous
teams tend to be more effective in non-traditional settings such as platform development.
Typically, innovation teams tasked with growth in large, mature firms tend to be
lightweight or heavyweight teams, depending upon the past history of the organization
and the success that they have had incorporating the two team structures. The
autonomous team structure tends to be more common when dealing with joint ventures
and/or acquisitions, which are more externally focused. However, despite the obvious
differences in the effectiveness of different team structures for different development
opportunities, organizations tend to adopt a dominant orientation or a standard
approach to organization regardless of the objectives of the task at hand. Typically
driven by past successes with projects and cultural as well as political issues within firms,
organizations gravitate, over time, to adopt a single organizational structure, with some
small degree of variation, regardless of the task. The dominant orientation, in turn,
determines the effectiveness of the organization at specific tasks that may be a misfit to
the strengths of the specific orientation. As explored in the next section, large firms are
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typically characterized by an "active inertia" that exhibits mean-reversion behavior - a
return to status quo whenever change is imposed upon the organization.
2.4 Inherent Rigidities in Large Firms
Processes within large, established firms are conditioned to reduce risk and prevent
decisions being made that are predicated on large levels of uncertainty. Growth
opportunities, however, inherently require the assumption of risk at levels that exceed
those deemed acceptable in large, established firms. To achieve sustained and profitable
growth, large, established firms need to create organizational structures and processes
that resolve the above paradox.
2.4.1 Organizational Rigor Mortis:
Christensen and Overdorf (Christensen and Overdorf 2000) build upon the core
competency concept to highlight how an organization's capabilities may become growth
inhibitors as it matures. Specifically, as a firm matures, its processes, including patterns
of interaction, coordination, communication, and decision making, are increasingly
streamlined for efficiency. When the same processes are used to tackle different tasks
however, they are likely to perform sluggishly. Organizations confronted by disruptive
change are able to redefine the more visible processes such as manufacturing, customer
service, logistics, etc., relatively quickly, but the less visible, background processes that
support decision making, resource allocation, and prioritization are often embedded much
deeper within a firm's processes. For example, the negotiation of plans and budgets,
resource allocation realities, and decision-making paradigms, such as those made
previously within a hierarchy, market analyses, financial modeling, and interpretation,
etc., are processes that require organizational change at more fundamental levels. Many
organizations find such processes most difficult to change. Additionally, over time, the
firm's processes reflect upon its cost structure. Critically, the cost structure that evolves
now begins to dictate a company's ability to profitably pursue existing and new
opportunities. As stated by Christensen and Overdorf (Christensen and Overdorf 2000), if
a company's overhead costs require it to achieve gross profit margins of 40%, decision
rules embedded within the company's processes encourage killing ideas that promise
gross margins below a threshold that is at or close to 40%.
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The above paradigm is particularly critical to firms seeking new growth. Existing cost
structures could end up as tremendous burdens for new opportunities to achieve, making
such efforts predestined to failure. For large, established firms, there is the additional
burden of opportunity size - a $40M company that wishes to grow by 20% needs to find
$8M in new revenue, but a $40B company wishing to grow by the same rate needs to find
$8B in new revenue. The point here isn't that it is unreasonable for large firms to grow at
the same rate as small firms, but growth opportunities for large firms are simultaneously
subject to two daunting filters (a) potential gross margins, and (b) opportunity size.
Opportunity size and opportunity uncertainty are typically directly correlated - the larger
the opportunity, the higher the uncertainty. Opportunities that are large enough and
exhibit the potential for sufficiently high margins inherently tend to be more risky. Since
large, established organizations are typically poorly conditioned to handle high risk, these
projects tend to survive the early filters only to fail subsequent filters that focus
increasingly on the viability of the business and technology opportunity. Filters that are
set up to eliminate opportunities below a certain size/margin and above a certain
uncertainty may ultimately find that the effects are mutually exclusive with the remaining
opportunities being few (if any) and narrow in scope, ultimately defeating the purpose of
revenue growth.
Typically, opportunities that survive the early filters (size and margins) tend to be
inherently uncertain from either a technology perspective, or a business perspective, or
both. The efficiency of organizational processes for improving technology and business
understanding now effectively determine the fate of the opportunity. If such processes,
conditioned during the maturation of the firm, are focused primarily on reducing
technology risk, technology uncertainty reduction will proceed efficiently but at the
expense of business uncertainty that proves increasingly daunting. Conversely, if such
processes are focused primarily on reducing business risk, business uncertainty reduction
proceeds efficiently at the expense of technology uncertainty. In practice, as uncertainty
grows, firm management is conditioned to react by elevating the decision making to ever
higher levels. This serves to delay decision making and magnify uncertainties further, as
an ever-growing set of questions are repeatedly asked, prompting evermore-frantic
activity at lower levels. Delayed decision-making results, at one extreme, in missing key
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windows of opportunity or, at the least, in increasing the amount of money being spent in
clarifying details that may or may not be knowable.
Donald Sull (Sull 1999) characterizes the problems of large, established firms as "active
inertia" - arising from an inability to take appropriate action rather than an inability to
take action. Active inertia, defined by Sull, is an organization's tendency to follow
established patterns of behavior - even in response to dramatic environmental shifts.
Typically, large, established firms owe their prosperity to a fresh competitive formula - a
combination of strategies, relationships, products, and values that sets them apart from
customers. As the formula succeeds, the positive feedback reinforces managers'
confidence that they've found the one, best way. Strategic frames - mental models and
mindsets that shape how managers view the world, including what business they are in,
who their competitors are, and how they create value - now become strategic blinders.
Processes harden into routines, past positive reinforcement having provided strong
incentives to sacrifice creativity with predictability (something necessary to coordinate
the activities of a complex organization). This routinization of processes prevents
employees from considering new ways of working; relationships become shackles, and
values harden into dogmas. Sull suggests approaching the problems from a perspective of
understanding the hindrances to growth, which in itself requires a fresh perspective. He
advocates that new leaders be found from outside the company or from within the
company but outside the core business to find this fresh perspective.
Any large, established firm is engaged in multiple concurrent projects. The importance of
aggregate-project (portfolio) planning has been described in considerable detail by
Wheelwright and Clark.(Wheelwright and Clark 1992) These plans lay out the sequence
of projects that the firm plans to undertake, as well as those that will be actively
supported at any one time. It specifies in considerable detail the types and mix of projects
that the firm plans to undertake over the planning horizon. In theory, portfolio planning
allows:
a) prioritization of projects according to previously defined criteria that align with
corporate and technology strategy,
Suresh Sunderrajan, SDM Thesis Page 33 12/18/2003
b) clear development and commercialization timelines that permit close alignment
with marketing strategy,
c) effective management of resources to prevent overcommitment or
undercommitment, and
d) planned enhancements of organizational skills and competencies that enable
continuous corporate renewal over the product life cycle.
Wheelwright and Clark go on to describe optimum portfolio planning strategies that
balance, on aggregate, the types of projects between the categories incremental, platform,
and radical projects as well as advanced R&D (blue-sky research), and
alliances/partnerships. Each of these project types provides different growth impetus and
requires different levels and mixes of resources. The relative mix of each of these project
categories is a function of forces in the firm's environment, the firm's capabilities, and
it's strategy. As an industry matures, opportunities for advanced development and
breakthrough projects decline; conversely, breakthrough projects become increasingly
risky. Incremental and derivative projects constitute increasingly higher fractions of the
mix. The authors suggest several steps that can be followed in the development of an
aggregate plan: (1) define types or classes of development projects that are to be covered;
(2) define the representative project of each type, the critical resources, and cycle time
required for complete development; (3) identify existing resources available for
development efforts; (4) compute capacity utilization; (5) establish desired future mix of
projects by type; (6) estimate the number of projects of each type that can be undertaken
with existing resources; (7) decide which projects to undertake; and (8) determine and
integrate into the project plan changes that are required to improve development
performance over time.
While portfolio planning offers a logical and seemingly straightforward process for firms
to plan their growth portfolio, actually carrying out the plan, as the authors admit, takes
hard choices and discipline. Typically, it is difficult to estimate the cycle time for a
development project, particularly for one that is in early-stage development. Resource
identification is usually not difficult; however, it is far too common to have these
resources significantly overloaded - particularly when considering projects that may be
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substantially different in terms of their stages of development. Despite wide recognition
that the efficiency of a resource, human, or machine drops off precipitously as its
utilization increases beyond a threshold-utilization rate, there is a tendency to add tasks
far in excess of this threshold. Practical difficulties in limiting this tendency include the
absence of system-level prioritization, resulting, for example, in resources supporting
competing business units jockeying for critical experimental and testing resources, poor
ability to forecast requirements early in the project, a proclivity to underestimate resource
requirements, over-ambitious project timelines, aggressive project leaders that are able to
manipulate the system to achieve their ends - often at the expense of other projects with
less well-connected leaders, the built-in inertia of budgeting systems that results in
automatic allocations for certain activities that may or may not be strategically aligned,
poor speed of decision-making - decisions that are relatively trivial often need to be
elevated to the appropriate level of management to get formal approval, etc.
2.4.2 Key Causes of Failure of Growth Ventures:
A very long list of causes of failure has been compiled in literature documenting growth
attempts in large, established firms.(Gee 1991; Wheelwright and Clark 1992; Baghai,
Coley et al. 1999; Mason and Rohner 2002). Some of these causes are listed in Table 3.1
- at a system level and at an individual project level. The existence of "corporate
antibodies" - institutionalized responses that stifle new growth ventures, has also been
recognized in the literature.(Christensen 1997; Christensen and Overdorf 2000; Mason
and Rohner 2002) At the root of this is the corporate culture that serves to minimize risk,
resolve conflict, maintain focus, and preserve continuity. These antibodies manifest
themselves in terms of restricting the innovation team's access to resources - human
resources, equipment, funding, etc., requiring excessive risk reduction (excessive from
the perspective of a start -up, which requires much time and effort to be focused around
justifying the planned course of action instead of executing it, requiring the innovation
team to follow corporate policies on matters peripheral to the business), which may result
in much slower order fulfillment and much longer justification processes as the team
struggles to get the attention and priority of service from organizations within the parent
organization that assess the team's progress using existing guidelines - using the previous
metrics to similar progress report formats that may really be more akin to comparing
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apples to oranges. Recognizing the existence of these antibodies is the first step toward
achieving non-traditional revenue growth in large firms. The second step is in actually
combating these antibodies in a fashion that renders them ineffective without actually
eliminating them, since they serve a strong purpose within the existing business.
Table 2.1 Common Causes of Failure to Achieve Non-Traditional Growth in Large Firms
At a system level:
1. Lack of top management commitment
2. Non-acceptance of charter by staff and operating manager
3. Unrealistic expectations
4. Improper implementation strategy/execution
5. Absence of influential, high-level champion
6. Flawed decision-making structures
7. Inappropriate risk/reward environment
8. Unbalanced growth portfolio
9. Wrong people/skills in place
These also include, at an individual project level:
1. Incomplete/mistaken opportunity assessment
2. Misalignment with corporate strategy
3. Resources spread too thin
4. Wrong personnel
5. Premature transfer to operating division
6. Politics
7. Nascent technology
8. Corporate capabilities are limited
9. Inadequate representation/participation by landing organization
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10. Misjudging resource and time needs
Typical corporate antibodies:
" Financial
Don't have a negative impact on short-term earnings
Don't change existing incentive policies
* Staff
Don't recruit our best people
Don't recruit from the outside
Don't distract top management
0 Strategic
Don't partner with competitors
Don't cannibalize current revenues
Don't jeopardize current trading relationships
Don't damage our brand
0 Operational
Don't move ahead quickly without further analysis
Don't violate existing corporate policies
The above reasons characterize several of the predominant causes that large organizations
find impede their growth prospects through non-traditional markets and technologies. To
successfully achieve growth, firms must recognize the inherent rigidities and systemic
antibodies and actively combat these through policy and execution.
2.5 Frameworks for Growth in Large, Established Firms
Organizationally, firms have a continuum of approaches that they use to respond to the
need for non-traditional growth.(Henderson 2003) As shown in Figure 2.3, these include
independent ventures, where the only relationship to the parent firm is investment;
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autonomous ventures, which typically include separate divisions or SBUs (separate
business unites) that report direct to executive management (often directly to the CEO),
work autonomously from the parent, and are often geographically separated to maximize
independence; integrated ventures, separate organizations with Profit/Loss responsibility
that are encouraged to leverage the existing infrastructure and integrate with existing
lines of business; innovation teams, focused and dedicated teams that work to develop a
system, including technologies, architecture, and business model but within the existing
SBU framework; and traditional R&D, where efforts are conducted within existing
functional sub-units in existing businesses.
Fig 2.3: Growth Modes Available to a Firm
Process
Flexibility
Control and Coordination
Large firms can, and do, use the spectrum of above approaches to achieve growth.
Typically, however, there is a failure to fully recognize the need for alternate
organizational structures that perform each of the above effectively. In the first part of
this chapter, I describe a few growth frameworks that have been suggested in the
literature. In the second part of this chapter, I describe the typical operational application
of these frameworks.
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2.5.1 Frameworks for Classifying Growth Opportunities:
Roberts and Berry (Roberts and Berry 1985) suggest a framework for selecting optimum
entry strategies for diversification in existing firms. They propose a framework, shown
below, for considering entry issues related to the degree of familiarity or newness of a
technology or service, as well as the degree of familiarity or newness of a market.
Familiarity is characterized by the degree to which the characteristics and patterns
associated with the technology and/or market are understood, while newness is
characterized by the degree to which the technology or markets have been addressed in or
by existing products. They propose that internal development is (and/or acquisition
and/or licensing are) the preferred entry strategy for technologies and markets that are
familiar, while venture capital and educational acquisitions are the preferred strategies for
unfamiliar technologies and markets. For combinations of familiar technology and
unfamiliar markets or vice versa, joint ventures appear to be most suitable. "New style"
joint ventures refer specifically to ventures wherein one firm (normally the smaller)
provides the technology, while the other firm (normally the larger) provides the
marketing, distribution channels, and sales. In addition to the framework itself, this study
highlights the need for large, established firms to adopt a multi-faceted approach
encompassing internal development, acquisitions, joint ventures, and venture capital
investments to make available a broad range of business development opportunities at the
lowest risk.
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Fig 2.4: Roberts and Berry Growth Framework - Market and Technology
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Courtney et al.(Courtney, Kirkland et al. 1997) provide another framework for growth in
large, established firms. Their framework is based upon characterizing the level of
uncertainty surrounding strategic decisions and tailoring strategy to the uncertainty
present. They characterize information relevant to business decisions, such as industry
trends, market demand, political stability, etc., as knowable and unknowable. Residual
uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty that remains after the best-possible analysis is
done. They define four levels of residual uncertainty:
Level 1: Residual uncertainty is trivial and/or irrelevant (a strategy for an incumbent
against a low-cost airline entrant).
Level 2: Alternate, discrete outcomes define the future (capacity strategies at chemical
plants).
Level 3: A range of possible outcomes define the future (continuous, as opposed to
discrete) (emerging technologies in consumer electronics).
Level 4: True ambiguity (entering the Russian market in 1992).
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The authors suggest that after analyzing the residual uncertainty using the appropriate
tools, the next step is to choose a strategic posture: as a Shaper (Leader), an Adapter
(Follower), or Reserving the right to play (Options). Shapers aim to drive their industry
toward a new structure of their own devise. Adapters take the current industry structure
and future evolution as givens, and they react to the opportunities that the market offers.
Reserving the right to play is a form of adapting where the company consciously makes
incremental investments that put it in a position to act or react, based upon future
decisions. Having determined a strategic posture, the authors suggest that the next step is
to build a portfolio of actions that matches the posturing strategy. These are categorized
as: Big bets (large commitments such as a major capital investment or acquisition),
Options (asymmetric payoffs that protect losses on the downside but offer big-payoff on
the upside), and No-regrets moves (that pay off regardless of the outcomes).
Jay Galbraith (Galbraith 1974) and Tushman and Anderson (Nadler and Tushman ) used
information-processing arguments and contingency theory to develop a framework that
can be applied for growth opportunities. As shown in the Figure 2.5, they map the task's
information-processing requirements with the team's information-processing capability.
Where there is conflict between the information processing requirements and capabilities,
they predict lower performance. Building upon the information-processing concept, it is
possible to use a design structure matrix (Eppinger, Whitney et al. 1994) framework to
map the information-processing needs versus real capability, and iterate through modified
organizational structures with different information-processing capability to a better fit
that yields higher performance.
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Fig 2.5: Galbraith Information Processing Framework
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2.5.2 Organizational Responses for Growth:
From the work done with organizational forms for growth, it is evident that the greater
the degree of independence from the organizational bureaucracy, typically, the faster the
team is able to move forward. Conventional wisdom advocates organizational separation
in times of intermittent technological change - to overcome organizational antibodies that
would otherwise overwhelm nascent efforts - through resource allocation, prioritization,
and politics, which may otherwise prove to be discontinuous to the existing business. Past
practice has been to isolate disruptive R&D teams to allow them the freedom to develop
Suresh Sunderrajan, SDM Thesis
High
12/18/2003Page 42
the technology, products, and even markets without the shackles of the existing
organizational structures and processes.
However, recent literature suggests that organizations that completely separate their
innovation teams tend to starve the innovation team of resources that are available within
the main organization, reduce their chance of success, and are, ultimately, unable to
integrate the learnings of the innovation team back into the mainstream organization.
Westerman, Iansiti, and McFarlan, in a paper entitled "The Incumbent's Advantage,"
explore the management of innovation in over 200 companies in several sectors of the
computer industry. They conclude from their analysis that organizations that mounted
integrated responses to technology change obtained critical advantages in the productivity
of their organizations, in the quality and performance of their products, and in their
ability to achieve sustained response to change. Specifically, the authors conclude that
integrated ventures and innovation teams appear to be superior structures for the
organization of innovation in established organizations. The authors focus on the
importance of structures that integrate people, processes, and technologies in a balanced
way. Highly differentiated, innovating approaches appear to provide early signals of
effectiveness, particularly since they may enable firms to act quickly, but they tend to
encounter difficulty in scaling and sustaining in the long term.(Westerman, Iansiti et al.
2002)
Leifer et al. (Leifer, O'Connor et al. 2001) discuss the process of radical innovation. In
addition to market and technology uncertainty as defined by Roberts, they discuss two
more sources of uncertainty: organizational and resource uncertainties. Organizational
uncertainties include such questions as project team capability, management support, etc.,
while resource uncertainties include questions on funding, access to the right resources,
etc. They focus particularly on managing organizational and resource uncertainties as the
keys for radical-innovation success. They suggest the creation of a radical-innovation hub
to reduce these uncertainties. Similar in concept to internal venture organizations or
incubators, these hubs comprise individuals trained in new-business development - that
are able to translate an idea into a business proposition and nurture the development
process until it is ready for commercialization. They state that radical innovation
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incubated in mainstream organizations achieve greater success than Skunk-Work projects
that develop in isolation from the rest of the organization.
In summary, the inherent conflicts between the requirements for non-traditional growth
and those for traditional growth/operational excellence present large, established firms
with a problem that they are simply ill suited to tackle effectively. Since growth is an
imperative for large, established firms, however, it is a problem that they ignore at their
peril. In this study, I focus on experiences to achieve growth within a single firm.
Through an analysis of three typical growth projects and the results of a survey
administered to 24 project leaders of non-traditional growth-related efforts, I develop a
new framework for characterizing growth opportunities and the key linkages necessary to
operationalize this framework.
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Chapter 3: Motivation and Hypothesis
3.1 Growth from a First-Person Perspective
In this section, I describe three key growth projects executed in a large, established firm.
These projects were selected for two main reasons (a) they sample different modalities
for non-traditional growth available in a large, established firm, and (b) I was personally
involved in each project and have access to reliable data for each. The objectives and
technology associated with each project is first described. This is followed by a
chronological listing of key events, over the duration of each project from inception
through July 2003. These projects are analyzed using three dimensions - technology,
market, and organization. Within each dimension, I characterize project uncertainty and
project interdependence. The resulting project vector is linked to the project
organizational structure. The data and resulting analysis are used to develop the
hypotheses for this study.
3.1.1 Project M: Internal Venture (Skunk Works):
Objectives:
a) Investigate the application of supercritical fluid technology to the generation of
nanomaterials
b) Investigate and establish the potential of using the above technology as a marking
technology.
c) Investigate and establish the potential of using the above technology as a thin film
coating technology.
d) Secure intellectual property for the applications involving nanomaterials
processing from supercritical fluids.
e) Drive revenue growth through one or more commercial applications of the above.
Technology:
All fluids have a thermodynamically defined state of temperature and pressure called a
critical point. Fluids that exist at temperatures and pressures above their critical point are
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called supercritical fluids. Supercritical fluids exhibit properties that are simultaneously
similar to that of a gas and a liquid - for example, they exhibit liquid-like density and
hence the capability of dissolving materials of interest; they also exhibit gas-like
diffusivity and surface tension. Carbon dioxide is the most commonly used supercritical
fluid because of its low cost, non-toxicity, and relatively low critical point (73 bar, 33'C).
Supercritical carbon dioxide is used commercially today to decaffeinate coffee and for
dry cleaning of clothes. It is also being investigated for a variety of applications including
purification of pharmaceuticals and nutraceuticals, cleaning of silicon wafers,
microlithography, etc.
Project M was exploring the use of supercritical carbon dioxide as a marking and as a
thin film coating technology. As mentioned above, supercritical fluids have liquid-like
ability to dissolve materials within them. By dissolving a dye material into supercritical
carbon doxide and then significantly and instantaneously reducing the pressure and/or
temperature, the dye materials rapidly supersaturates the solution and precipitate as nano-
sized particles. If the precipitation occurs through an appropriately designed
orifice/nozzle, the precipitated nanoparticles may be guided onto a substrate, just as an
inkjet printer, with the key difference being that, in this case, the solvent evaporates prior
to the "ink" striking the substrate. Such a process, appropriately engineered, can be used
for marking as well as for thin film coating, producing thin uniform coatings that rival the
quality of currently practiced vacuum deposition processes.
Table 3.1: Chronological Event Listing for Project M
Date Event Explanation
Feb, 2000 Ideation Hallway conversation between two scientists sparks
an idea. Organization Director walks by and stops to
ask about the excited buzz in the room. Suggests that
scientists contact him later if they want to pursue the
idea some more. Scientists refine the idea with the
help of some background research.
Mar, 2000 Seed funding Scientists approach Org. Director for some funding
to pursue proof of concept. After a couple of
meetings, obtain $5K for a business trip to a
university that had the appropriate equipment
available.
June, 2000 Preliminary proof Results from university experiments suggest several
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Date Event Explanation
of concept intriguing potential opportunities
Sept, 2000 Budget allocation Two full-time equivalents assigned to Project M
Oct, 2000 Team expansion Team expands to include partial equivalents of 2
other scientists/engineers within the organization
Nov, 2000 Follow-up Additional experiments at University verify initial
experimentation results and add new potential possibilities
Jan-May, 'Selling' Series of presentations to key layers of organization
2001 management in several functional and BU silos in
search of strategic fit and funding. Lukewarm
interest from two BU communities.
June, 2001 Received small Funding allocated to equipment purchase (-$65K).
capital funding Two key pieces of equipment purchased.
Oct, 2001 Team expansion Team expands further to include another 2 partial
equivalents.
Jan, 2002 Equipment In-house experimentation begins in earnest. Key
received, installed development goal is to demonstrate inkjet printing
and commissioned capability as the proof-of-concept for a
'print'engine'
April-Aug, 'Selling' Funding for next budget year sought. BU
2002 Management related to one application area denies
further investment citing technology development
horizon as outside their investment window. Some
renewed interest from BU Management related to
second application area with specific and different
needs from current project goals.
Oct, 2002 Team changes Two part-time and one full-time equivalent exit the
project while another two full-time equivalents begin
participation
Nov, 2002 Co-location Project team co-located near lab
Dec, 2002 More capital Third capital equipment item, with related
investment capability, is purchased and installed
Mar, 2003 Renewed attention Addition part-time equivalent added to drive
to business business assessment
applications
July, 2003 Workshop with key Project struggling to find strategic fit and direction.
participants to Team leadership disagrees strongly on the path
ideate new machine forward.
concepts
Analysis of Project M:
Technology: Project M builds upon the firm's technical core competencies in the areas of
particle precipitation and the associated fluid mechanics, organic and polymeric
chemistry, and coating process technology. The technology underpinnings of Project M
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are novel, as evidenced by the over 40 intellectual property applications and over 8
granted applications at the time of this writing. It is important to note, however, that
while the technology requirements do overlap with the firm's core competencies,
nevertheless, they require additional advanced technology development beyond existing
know-how in related but different areas, such as high-pressure processes, nanomaterials
characterization, etc.
Market: While Project M has the potential to create products and market opportunities
within several markets, the relatively early and fundamental stage of technology
development precludes an obvious market outlet. Despite attempts by the Project Team
and Sponsoring Management to create market alignment with existing markets, multiple
efforts to position this alignment failed to create a lasting alliance between the Project
Team and a Strategic Business Unit.
Organization: The Project Leader and Project Team were able to create a strong push for
this technology within the Process Research Organization of the firm. However,
resources were typically hard to come by because of the "Skunk Works" nature of the
project. The Project Team was best characterized as a Lightweight Team. Key technical
human resources were borrowed on a part-time basis while key marketing and sales
human resources were simply unavailable to the project team over the duration of the
project covered by this study. The Project Team was expanded, mostly through the
informal networks of the Project Leader with the implicit approval of immediate
management. Given the differences in the technology requirements between the existing
technical resources that were available and the required technical expertise, however,
part-time technical resources were slow to progress the understanding necessary to
further the technology. Process equipment was made available but was capped at a small-
capital level that could be approved by the Sponsoring Management without having to go
to higher management levels within the firm. Again this limited the pace of technical
progress. Project exposure to higher levels of management failed to produce lasting
strategic impact on the project objectives, which was due primarily to conflicting
direction. For example, the Team worked on the specific application of this technology to
Inkjet Printing for over a year before receiving clear signals from the appropriate SBU
that this technology was not in consideration for future product platforms. Attempts to
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identify and leverage prior paths to success by Skunk Works activities were short-lived,
as successful parallels were not found.
3.1.2 Project L: Internal - R&D
Objectives:
a) Through appropriate materials and process technology enhancements, reduce the
cost of an existing imaging support technology platform by 33% without
compromising the current product feature set or requiring accommodations to the
existing downstream processes. (Given the fact that this technology platform has
used the existing product architecture for almost 40 years during which the
platform has evolved, matured, and been subject to several iterations of cost
optimization, this is a stretch objective.)
b) Explore additional growth opportunities that leverage this technology platform
being developed.
Technology:
An investigation into the current product cost structure revealed that the program
objectives could only be achieved through a combination of materials and labor savings.
An all-synthetic support made from foamed polyolefins using a multi-layer web
architecture was shown to be able, under specific process conditions, to achieve the
desired objectives.
Foaming of polyolefins is an established technology practiced by companies such as
Cryovac-Sealed Air, Down-Coming, Berwick, etc, for products such as packaging
materials, building insulation, ribbons, etc. However, the foams made using the above
processes, unmodified, have inferior properties for imaging support applications. The
thrust of this investigation therefore is process-product codevelopment to make foams
with the appropriate properties with minimal capital investment. The specific foaming
technology of interest here is endothermic (versus exothermic), chemical (versus
physical) foaming. Program L comprises the technology and business investigation of the
product and process technologies involved in the creation of this new technology
platform. In addition to creating a new platform for existing product lines, this
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technology process could enable new opportunities in other related but non-traditional
markets, such synthetic paper markets, electronic imaging products, and in packaging.
Key to progressing this program was the purchase of suitable pilot capital to validate the
process and product architecture assumptions in the business model. There was no pilot
asset available to the project team that was capable of producing the product at the
projected manufacturing speeds or width. In fact, capabilities that did exist were known
to have poor scaleability. As the first step toward an overall capital investment of
~$200M, the technology team recommended the purchase of a suitable pilot machine for
-$1 OM - $15M. This machine would have been capable of being scaled-up to be the first
manufacturing asset making the new product for commercial application while enabling
an investigation into the robustness of the proposed new technology platform.
Table 3.2: Chronological Event Listing for Project L
Date Event Explanation
Aug, 2000 Project launch. Three concurrent parallel technology investigations
launched
Sept, 2000 Program Leader Program leader appointed to oversee technology
appointed investigations and integrate results. Project Team
grows from -8 part time technologists to 6 full time
and 30 part time technologists.
Nov, 2000 Program Review Matrix comparison of technologies on vectors of
(one/two performance, timing, and potential savings. One
prototyping cycles) technology emerges as a front-runner but multiple
approaches remain in consideration and under
investigation.
Feb, 2001 Program Review Matrix comparison repeated based upon more
(additional detailed investigation. Front-running technology
prototyping cycle) investigation discontinued - deemed to require too
much capital investment, foster too much
dependency on manufacturing partner corporation,
and not quite meet timing requirements with capital
investment deemed to be 3-5 years away from full
commercialization. One sub-technology
investigation emerges from each of the two other
technology investigations as the lead candidates.
June, 2001 Program Review Second technology investigation discontinued. This
technology was shown to be incapable of meeting
performance requirements without radical new
inventions that were, in turn, deemed to be unlikely.
Remaining technology investigation emerges as onl
Suresh Sunderrajan, SDM Thesis 12/18/2003Page 50
Date Event Explanation
remaining technology.
July, 2001 Business Team Foam extrusion technology investigation and
investigation development of detailed business model to study
launched product features/performance, materials,
manufacturing process, supply chain, purchasing,
capital, and corporate relationship implications by
Cross-functional Team commissioned for this
purpose.
Aug/Sept, Business Team Business model results show that with existing
2001 investigation proposed product architecture and materials, savings
concludes; target cannot be met. Additional opportunities
Executive Reviews identified and prioritized.
held
Oct, 2001 Investigation Business model results in reduced funding for core
scaled-back, foaming technology investigation for Y2002.
Learnings spun out Opportunities in the use of alternate process
to begin alternate technology (coextrusion coating) and alternate
investigations materials (polypropylene) spun out into separate
investigations to take advantage of potential savings
within the current commercial product architecture.
Nov, 2001 Multiple separate Three separate programs launched - an investigation
technology of foaming technology, an investigation of
investigations coextrusion coating, an investigation of
launched polypropylene materials technology. The latter two
have a charter to complete technology investigations
and begin commercialization by YE, 2002, and Mar,
2003, respectively.
June, 2002 Business model re- Technology investigations report significant
visited progress. This leads to a substantial swing in project
NPV.
July, 2002 New Program To progress project investigation, new program
Manager appointed manager appointed. Project Team expanded to
accommodate increased priority given to this
program.
Aug, 2002 Executive Review Business model results presented to Company
held Executives (Vice Presidents in Development,
Manufacturing, and Business Unit). Aggressive
progress recommended through investment in
dedicated pilot capital (to validate product and
process). Results of executive review foster creation
of 60-day plan to investigate manufacturing details
(pilot location, capability and costs), transition plan
(from one set of materials and suppliers to the future
set - platform switching costs) and macroeconomic
factors that affect materials choice (global
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Date Event Explanation
commodity market pricing cycles).
Nov, 2002 Executive Review Results of 60-day plan presented to Executive
follow-up committee. Requests received for follow-up reviews
with each sponsor separately. Manufacturing VP
stakes position that project risk is too high at this
stage of technology development for Manufacturing
to request capital expenditure (for pilot and
manufacturing). Responsibility of carrying program
capital falls on R&D and BU.
Dec, 2002 Strategic shift in Decision made by Project Team to pitch pilot capital
Business Model as a real option instead of static NPV. Individual
pitch meetings with R&D and BU Executive sponsors.
Path forward crafted to approach Corporate Capital
Committee.
Jan, 2003 Executive Reviews Debate upon pilot requirements - cost versus
held again features.
June, 2003 Project Preview At the annual strategic review, the SPG manager
with CEO reviewed the project with the Firm's Executive
Management Team. Decision made to hold a
separate review meeting focused specifically on this
project - deep-dive into the technology and business
case.
July, 2003 Project Due to (a) intensive capital expenditure projection
Cancellation and (b) strategic misalignment with stated growth
directions, project is cancelled.
Analysis of Project L:
Technology: Project L builds upon the firm's technical core competencies in the areas of
polymer science, materials science, polymer processing, and imaging support
development. The technology underpinnings of Project L are novel as evidenced by the
over 20 intellectual property applications and over 6 granted applications at the time of
this writing. It is important to note, however, that while the technology requirements do
overlap with the firm's core competencies, nevertheless, they require additional advanced
technology development beyond existing know-how in related but different areas, such as
foam extrusion, machine-direction orientation, materials processing using different
materials sets than existing technologies, etc.
Market: Project L was able to leverage the strong pull from an existing SBU as well as
attempt to exploit platform synergies with other SBUs interested in product applications
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within their markets of interest. The pull from within the existing SBU was, however, a
double-edged sword - whereas, on the one hand, there were no conflicts about target
markets and customers and the appropriate technical objectives for these customers, on
the other hand, there were considerable constraints placed upon process and product
architectures explored as well as the schedule requirements. Customer needs were well
understood and deviating from existing needs was not considered a viable option.
Organization: The Project Team was best characterized as a Lightweight Team. The
Team Leader was primarily tasked with coordinating technology development with all
market-related decisions outside the purview of the team. Technical human resources
were relatively easy to come by for technology development primarily due to the strong
pull from the existing SBU. Roles and responsibilities were defined early and built upon
previous projects that dealt with various component technology-related development
projects. A well-established decision-making structure existed for all tactical issues.
3.1.3 Project P: Internal Venture (Incubator)*
(* - it is noted that substantial changes in the organizational form for this project have
been made since July, 03 - the following description and analysis review only the data
preceding the organizational changes and project changes in July, 03)
Objectives:
a) Investigate revenue growth opportunities in the 2-5 year timeframe in the field of
Packaging. Specifically, identify opportunities where the firm's existing core
technology competencies may offer some specific advantage through leverage.
b) Develop a business through matching technology offerings suitable for the
Packaging industry with current technical capabilities.
Technology:
Unlike the other programs wherein the technology is either partially or wholly internally
developed, this program began as an investigation of business opportunities and tried to
match opportunities to technical competencies. The firm had an internal venture
organization called the Systems Concept Center (SCC). The SCC was funded through an
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internal venture board modeled on typical venture capital driven processes. Programs are
selected based upon their individual merit but attempts are made to classify ongoing
projects into broadly defined domains. One such domain that was identified about two
years ago was Packaging.
As investigations into packaging evolved, two opportunities - a shorter-term play in
labeling and a longer-term opportunity in the field of active packaging emerged. The
labeling opportunity evolved from the combination of a new thermal imaging printer and
a thermal imaging media, both of which had been previously developed through other
programs. Given the existence of both printer and media, the focus of this investigation
was in finding the best application of this "solution." An investigation into active
packaging opportunity revealed opportunities in oxygen barrier, moisture barrier, and
antimicrobial packaging for food applications through the use of internal competencies in
organic/polymer chemistry, inorganic chemistry, and high-speed, roll-to-roll multi-layer
coating technology.
Table 3.3: Chronological Event Listing for Project P
Date Event Explanation
Jun, 2001 Project launch. Project emerged as the result of an ideation session
that produced a suggestion that the sponsoring team
review options related to Packaging since there
appeared to be a good fit from a technology
perspective
Sept, 2001 First Venture Board A review of Packaging strategies reveals a possible
Presentation opportunity in making high-end labels - this was
attractive from the viewpoint that projected revenues
were fairly near-term.
Oct, 2001 Business Day-long session with Packaging Industry analyst
Consultant identified several opportunities for further
interviewed investigation.
Mar, 2002 Opportunity Continued investigation of the labeling opportunity
Assessment reveals a fair business case for revenues of $50
Million/year through the sales of a high-speed
thermal print engine and label stock consumnables to
professional print-houses. Development of the
thermal print engine was practically complete as was
development of the thermal media. Further
development activities were focused on the
finishing/conversion of media and on coating an
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Date Event Explanation
adhesive layer (both of which were low technical
risk issues)
Sept, 2002 Third Venture Primary focus of this presentation was the labeling
Board Presentation opportunity. With the Professional Imaging Business
Unit expressing an active interest in taking the
product to market, the commercialization process
was accelerated. A secondary effort focusing on
long-term opportunities in Packaging was initiated.
Oct, 2002 Transfer Project transferred to BU along with key project
personnel to provide continuity
Dec, 2002 Focus narrowed to Two specific opportunities were identified
Active and a) Materials for active packaging
Intelligent b) Coatings for active packaging
Packaging
opportunities
Mar, 2003 Market Research A consultant from an Ivy League School's Food
Science department was retained for concept-related
discussions. The result was renewed activity related
to materials and coatings efforts. This was followed
with a burst of experimental activity culminating in a
series of tests that showed promising results.
June, 2003 A second visit from the consultant reviewed the
testing protocols used and the implications of the
results.
June, 2003 Movement of the Reorganization of the System Concept Center into
project into the an Early Stage Ideator and an Accelerator/Incubator
Accelerator SPG resulted in the partitioning of projects between the
two. A determination of where a project was to be
positioned was made as a function of the time before
new revenues could be generated as a direct result of
commercialization activities related to the project.
July, 2003 NEXT Team Project received an infusion of interest and renewed
Review with the attention.
CEO and Executive
, Council _
Analysis of Project P:
Technology: Project P builds upon the firm's technical core competencies in the areas of
imaging science, printer, and media development for the shorter-term opportunity while
building upon materials science, formulary expertise, and large-scale small particle
manufacturing for the longer-term opportunity. The technology underpinnings of Project
P are novel as evidenced by the over 15 intellectual property applications at the time of
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this writing - over 10 for the shorter-term opportunity and over 5 for the longer-term
opportunity. Technology development for the shorter-term opportunity was, however,
largely complete by the time this project began. There was a substantial overlap between
the firm's technical capabilities and the product requirements for the shorter-term
opportunity. It is important to note, however, that while the technology requirements
overlap with the firm's core competencies, nevertheless, with respect to the longer-term
opportunities from this project, the application areas of these technologies (and related
product formulation, testing, and validation issues) were significantly different from the
areas of traditional expertise within the firm. For example, there was little understanding
of specialty material needs for food packaging, EPA and FDA regulations, food industry
guidelines, etc.
Market: Project P, as previously mentioned, began through an exploration of the fit
between the firm's technical competencies and market needs. As such, the market
mapping activities were critical to project progress. Early involvement of appropriate
business research resources helped progress this project quickly through the initial stages
of opportunity exploration. For the shorter-term opportunity, there existed overlap
between the firm's existing customer base and the target customer base, resulting in a
strong pull from an existing SBU. Additionally, the firm's brand and reputation provided
powerful leverage for business development. However, for the longer-term opportunity,
there existed poor overlap between the firm's customer base and the target customer base,
as a result, there was no direct interest from any existing SBU. In addition, the firm's
brand provided little, if any, leverage.
Organization: The Project Team was best characterized as a Lightweight Team, although
with a different flavor than the Teams for Projects M and L. The Team Leader was
primarily tasked with coordinating market and business development with all technology-
related decisions outside the purview of the team. Business development human
resources were relatively easy to come by primarily because of the existing network
within the Project Team. Linkages between the project team and the firm's R&D
organizations were weak, at best. There were no previous examples of projects with
similar linkage requirements that the Team could build upon. On the one hand, the
Venture Board served as a decision making body for the Team but on the other, the
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inherent technology development requirements of the longer-term opportunity limited the
Venture Board's decision-making influence because of the lack of suitable linkages back
into the firm's primary development organizations.
3.1.4 Summary of Projects from a First-Person Perspective
The above analysis is summarized in the figure below. It can be argued, based upon the
previous discussion, that each project occupies a distinct position in the 3-dimensional
space mapped by the analysis of project-specific technology, market, and organizational
factors. It is interesting that, regardless of the vector location of each project in this space,
the organization team structure used to execute the project is identical, i.e., lightweight
project teams. These observations, taken in combination with the literature summary in
Chapter 2 of this study, make it reasonable to ask the following questions:
a) Does the project vector location predispose the project to success or failure,
depending upon firm-specific characteristics?
b) What firm-specific characteristics are most important?
c) What can a firm do to improve the odds of project success through careful project
selection, i.e., is there a fit between project vector location and organizational
structure that can improve the odds of project success?
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Fig 3.1: Proposed Growth Framework - Technology, Market, and Organization
Organization
Market
Technology
I draw the following inferences from the previous analysis that form the basis for this
study's hypotheses:
a) Non-traditional growth opportunities require three independent dimensions for
complete characterization - technology, market, and organization.
b) Within each dimension, there is simultaneously a need for understanding what is
known and what is unknown (uncertainty) as well as what is aligned with firm
competencies/capabilities and what is not (interdependence).
c) Non-traditional growth projects characterized using the above dimensions may
differ widely in the vector characterizing their position in dimensional space.
d) Firm-specific capabilities and competencies may predispose the success or failure
of projects, depending upon the position of this vector.
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e) If a firm is to be successful in executing projects that occupy different vector
positions in this space, it must match the vector position with the organizational
structure most suited to the spatial position under consideration.
f) The firm must consciously expand its capabilities from an organizational structure
perspective to go beyond a single, predominant organizational structure for
growth to actively nurture the structure that provides the best fit to the
contingency at hand.
3.2 Hypothesis:
I hypothesize that the problems in achieving growth in large, established firms
predominantly stem from the inherent rigidities of these firms in adapting their structures
and processes to deal effectively with the concomitant change in emphasis, from
minimizing risk, reducing variability, and maintaining focus to maximizing speed,
encouraging creativity, and leveraging uncertainty.
I further hypothesize that in order to successfully grow, large, established firms will have
to pay particular attention to the structures and processes associated with the teams
tasked with growth.
In this study, I build upon previously proposed frameworks for growth, specifically those
of Roberts (Roberts and Berry 1985) and Leifer, (Leifer, O'Connor et al. 2001) and also
build upon structural contingency theories that characterize growth opportunities based
upon uncertainty and interdependence to (a) frame the opportunity strategically and (b)
use the strategic framework to provide an analytical link from growth opportunity to
organizational form that is most suited to delivering growth, given the uncertainty and
interdependence of the opportunity.
3.2.1 A Modified Framework for Exploiting Growth Opportunities
The existing literature on strategic responses to growth opportunities can be summarized
using the following 2 x 2 matrix. Specifically, with increasing market and technology
uncertainty and decreasing interdependence or alignment with existing core
competencies, firms will want to shift the focus of development from within to without -
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moving from the use of internal R&D and innovation teams to joint ventures and
acquisitions.
Fig 3.2: Existing Uncertainty Interdependence Segmentation
>1
U
o
Low High
Interdependence
Alignment with existing core competencies
While the above framework appears, on the surface, to be an adequate description of a
growth framework for large firms, nevertheless a deeper examination of the typical non-
traditional opportunities for large firms that survive internal opportunity size, gross
margin, and timing filters reveals that such opportunities lie typically at or near the
central area of the four quadrants (as shown in the figure below). Opportunities with high
interdependence and low uncertainty typically map into the strategic path forward and
five-year plans of existing traditional businesses within the firm. Opportunities with low
interdependence and high uncertainty typically do not survive internal opportunity
selection filters because the risk they embody is too high for large firms conditioned to
minimize risk.
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Fig 3.3: Drawbacks in the Existing Uncertainty Interdependence Segmentation
Non-traditional growth opportunities
lie in the gray zone
0
4J
U
0
0
Low High
Big bets
Incremental
Interdependence
Alignment with existing core competencies
Opportunities that pass selection filters tend to cluster around the center of the above
matrix. I contend, based upon my experience, that for opportunities that map into this
space, the firm almost always goes through a comprehensive internal opportunity
assessment and evaluation. I argue that the three projects described in the previous
section are typical of such opportunities and that these fall within the central gray area,
despite their different vector positions on a three-dimensional space. Substantial time and
money is spent in the evaluation of these opportunities. Better strategic characterization
up front and improved organizational structure strategies would significantly improve a
firm's efficiency in dealing with such opportunities.
Building upon the above framework, therefore, the following analysis process is
proposed:
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* During the opportunity-assessment phase, determine the uncertainty present with
respect to technology, the market, and the organization using a "market-back"
approach.
" Also during the opportunity assessment phase, determine the interdependence as
characterized by alignment of the opportunity with existing core competencies,
existing markets, and existing resources.
* Match the uncertainty and interdependence with the appropriate organizational
structure to maximize the chance of success.
* The firm now has two choices - adapt to the use of the appropriate organizational
structure or reject the opportunity under consideration.
The analysis is predicated on three key dimensions - technology, market, and
organization factored on 2 x 2 matrices into uncertainty and interdependence. Technology
uncertainty is defined through the opportunity assessment results in terms of the existence
of suitable technology (typically, this is verified through the effort of building
successively more detailed prototypes). Technology uncertainty is low when technologies
that support the opportunity exist and have a capability to deliver projected requirements.
Technology uncertainty is high when technologies that support the opportunity require
significant and/or multiple inventions. For example, the technology uncertainty for grid
computing would be considered high, whereas that for DRAM would be considered low.
Market uncertainty is defined through the existence of a market related to the
opportunity. Market uncertainty is low when markets (products, customers, competitors,
channels, sales, etc.) exist, and needs are known, for the opportunity being investigated.
Market uncertainty is high when markets simply do not exist and/or customer needs are
unknown. For example, market uncertainty is low for LCD displays, whereas it is
relatively high for waterproof LCD displays. Organizational uncertainty arises from an
analysis of (a) the decision-making structures within the organization relative to those on
or directly accessible to the (potential) project team and (b) historical predictors of
success from similar opportunities. Organizational uncertainty is high when the decision
making occurs at levels substantially higher (greater than two levels) above the project
leader, and historical predictors suggest a very low probability of success from past
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experience (<10%). Organizational uncertainty is low when decision making occurs at or
immediately above the level of the project leader and historical predictors suggest a
reasonable probability of success from past experience (>25%). For example,
organizational uncertainty for projects involving significant capital expense, such as
building a new technology platform, is typically high whereas uncertainty for projects
involving evolutionary feature improvements in existing product lines is typically low.
Technology interdependence is defined through a mapping of key technology
development needs identified for a given opportunity with the existing organizational
capabilities (existing abilities) and competencies (potential capabilities). Technology
interdependence is high when the organizational capabilities overlap in large part with the
technology development needs for a given opportunity. Technology interdependence is
low when there is little overlap of the organizational competencies with the technology
development needs for a given opportunity. Market interdependence is defined through a
mapping of a firm's existing market base with the potential market base for a given
opportunity. Market interdependence is high when existing markets (including channels,
sales force, etc.) are the primary targets of the new opportunity. Market interdependence
is low when there is little or no overlap between existing markets and those targeted by
the new opportunity. Organizational interdependence arises from an analysis of the
availability and accessibility of suitable internal resources - including human resources,
funding, and appropriate tools. Organizational interdependence is low when the
availability of key internal resources is severely limited. Organizational interdependence
is high when the availability and accessibility of key internal resources is high. The
following 2 x 2 matrices summarize the key dimensions discussed above.
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Fig 3.4: Proposed Uncertainty Interdependence Segmentation - Technology
Technology
High
Uncertainty
Low
Inventions reqd.,
Not practiced internally
Inventions reqd.,
Practiced internally
4
No inventions reqd.,
Not practiced internally
Low
No inventions reqd.,
Practiced internally
High
Interdependence
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Fig 3.5: Proposed Uncertainty Interdependence Segmentation - Markets
Markets
High Needs uncertain, Needs uncertain,
No existing customers Possibly existing customers
Uncertainty
Needs known, Needs known,
Low No existing customers Existing customers
High
Interdependence
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Fig 3.6: Proposed Uncertainty Interdependence Segmentation - Organization
Organization
High Low empowerment, Low empowerment,
Poor history, Poor history,
Scarce resources Available resources
Uncertainty
High empowerment, High empowerment,
Low Good history, Good history,
Scarce resources Available resources
Low High
Interdependence
The above framework, while comprehensive, nevertheless is difficult to use
meaningfully, given the relatively large number of combinations (4 x 4 x 4 = 64 possible
combinations). In technologically oriented firms, non-traditional growth opportunities
tend mostly to include a strong technology component that builds upon existing
technology competencies and capabilities. More specifically, each of the three projects
described in the previous section can be characterized on a technology dimension as
having high uncertainty and high interdependence. I simplify the earlier hypothesis by
assuming that this generally holds true in technologically oriented firms that a majority of
non-traditional growth opportunities will lay in the same quadrant - high uncertainty and
high interdependence. Accordingly, I postulate that the differentiating dimensions for
non-traditional growth in large, technologically oriented firms are those of market
and organization.
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When interdependence is high and uncertainty is low, internal development is definitely
preferred. When interdependence is low and uncertainty is high, external development,
through acquisitions, joint ventures, and/or corporate venture investments, is definitely
preferred. Typically, however, as previously discussed, growth opportunities for large,
established firms are characterized by combinations of high uncertainty and high
interdependence or low uncertainty and low interdependence. For such combinations,
external development becomes a strategic option instead of an imperative. As such,
internal development is typically explored in some, often substantial, detail before
making decisions on the possibility and extent of external development. Organizational
structure decisions now become vitally important to project success, particularly in the
timing of these decisions.
From an organizational perspective, as previously mentioned, development is typically
conducted through one of four main organizational forms - functional teams, lightweight
teams, heavyweight teams, and autonomous teams. When the opportunity is well defined
in terms of scope and scale, and the participation strategy is previously laid out in
considerable detail, roles, responsibilities, incentives, and priorities tend to be relatively
clear. In such endeavors, functional teams and/or lightweight teams tend to perform quite
well. Projects that can avail of existing roles and responsibilities in organizations tend to
have high interdependence. When uncertainty is low, functional teams are best suited;
when uncertainty is high, lightweight teams are better because the increased level of
uncertainty requires better communication and coordination across disciplines,
necessitating the role of a project manager.
When the participation strategy is less well -defined, but the opportunity scope and scale
is well defined, the need for a project manager who is able to communicate and
coordinate across functions is increasingly more important. For such opportunities
wherein interdependence is high, as the requirement for new roles is known, these roles
can be filled by others in the parent organization. In such instances, lightweight teams are
effective. When interdependence is low, however, such roles may or may not exist.
Clearly, in such instances, there needs to be much greater flexibility within the team for
redefining roles and responsibilities on an on-going basis, as more information is
gathered and progress is made. In such instances, heavyweight teams are more
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appropriate, particularly as the needs for role definition, cross-functional coordination,
and execution speed increase. The actual structure of these teams, in turn, is closely
related to the uncertainty type and level. The flavor of a heavyweight team working on a
non-traditional growth opportunity with low interdependence, high technology
uncertainty, and high market uncertainty is typically different from one with low
interdependence, high technology uncertainty, and low market uncertainty.
When opportunity definition is part of the team's charter, the scope and scale of the
opportunity as well as the participation strategy need to be formulated as the team
progresses. In such cases, development, typically, is no longer constrained to internal
paths but also includes external development as part of the path to commercialization.
Heavyweight or autonomous structures are best suited in these cases because of issues
related with flexibility in roles and responsibilities and alignment of incentives and
priorities. When opportunity definition is incomplete, and roles and responsibilities are
poorly defined, it is typically difficult to obtain the needed priority to work on such
projects within large firms. Resources are difficult to obtain, including suitable personnel,
access to needed equipment, and money because of the inherently high risk involved with
such projects and the inability to directly relate the use of the resource to the impact on
the firm's immediate fortunes. Different team members are also, typically, incentivized
differently, relative to their perspectives on the project's success. For example, a capital
engineer who is incentivized to complete a capital project on time and under budget, may
be, understandably, tempted in the case of a non-traditional growth project that requires
capital expenditures, to inflate the time and monetary requirements for the project, given
the inherent uncertainty in the project, to ensure that he is not penalized for deliverables
that are inherently uncertain. Similarly, a marketing manager may be tempted to skew the
requirements toward development of new products that are more radical in nature than
otherwise because his incentives are related to market share while the manufacturing
manager may be tempted to force requirements the other way to improve his
commitments to operating efficiency, which are adversely affected by more complex
products. Such conflicting incentives are typically at the root of the failure of non-
traditional growth projects in large firms. To eliminate the mismatch in incentives,
heavyweight and/or autonomous teams are most suited for projects with low
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interdependence and high uncertainty on at least one of the two dimensions of market and
organization. Such teams, by virtue of the reporting structure, eliminate local incentive
mismatches by incentivizing the team as a whole to deliver a project successfully. Local
incentive mismatches are now resolved within the team through constructive debate and
suitable give-and-take attitudes as opposed to being hidden behind organizational silos
typical in large, established firms.
Autonomous teams are most useful after the opportunity assessment phase of a new
opportunity. If there is a sizeable opportunity identified, that requires single-minded
pursuit, and that is characterized by high uncertainty and low interdependence on market
and organizational dimensions, autonomous teams are preferred.
The above discussion is summarized in the figure below. F, L, H and A are the four
common organizational forms - functional, lightweight, heavyweight, and autonomous.
M and 0 stand for Market and Organizational dimensions, respectively. U and I stand for
uncertainty and interdependence, respectively. Functional teams are not preferred given
the high technology uncertainty that characterizes non-traditional growth opportunities in
technologically oriented large firms. Lightweight teams are preferred for such
opportunities in large firms when the market and organizational uncertainty are low,
regardless of the market and organizational interdependence. Heavyweight teams are
preferred when market and organizational uncertainty is high while interdependence is
also high. Autonomous teams are preferred when market and organizational uncertainty
are high while market and organizational interdependence are low. It is recognized that
although the figure and discussion refer to hard boundaries between the four quadrants, it
is possible, and preferable in the appropriate cases, to have teams, for example, with a
predominantly heavyweight character that function more autonomously than other
heavyweight teams because of the nature of the opportunity at hand.
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Fig 3.7: Proposed Mapping from Uncertainty-Interdependence to Team Structure
F L
Not Preferred M U
MI-I Low or High
0-U LAoW,
A. H
AE HN
3.2.2 Application of the proposed framework:
The three projects discussed in Section 3.1 span a range in scope and scale but share the
ultimate objective of growing revenues. A critical analysis of each of these projects is
done using the growth framework proposed above. The results are summarized in the
tables below.
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Table 3.4: Analysis of Three Growth Projects - Dimensions and Factors
Project Tech. Tech. Market Market Org. Org.
Uncert. Interdep. Uncert. Interdep. Uncert. Interdep.
M H H H L H L
L H H L H L H
P H H L L H H
First, I look at technology uncertainty and interdependence. Project M is in the early
stages of concept proof requiring substantial innovation and invention before delivering a
product, which results in high technology uncertainty. However, with in-house expertise
in precipitation technology, chemistry, and functionalization, technology interdependence
is high. Project L requires substantial invention from a materials and a process
perspective to deliver a new imaging support platform, which results in high technology
uncertainty. Again, because there is substantial in-house expertise in the system from
output manufacture through image processing, technology interdependence is high.
Project P has high technology uncertainty in that the primary application to food
packaging is not well understood from a requirements or formulary perspective. Again,
however, because there is substantial in-house small, particle manufacturing capability,
technology interdependence is high.
From a market perspective, Project M has high market uncertainty and low market
interdependence, because the market is nascent, if it exists at all, and the customers lie
outside the existing customer base for the firm. For Projects L and P, market uncertainty
is low in that the market exists and is well established in both cases. However, for Project
L unlike Project P, market interdependence is high because the existing customers
substantially overlap with the target customers, while for Project P there is little if any
overlap in customers.
Suresh Sunderrajan, SDM Thesis 12/18/2003Page 71
From an organizational perspective, Project M shows high uncertainty and low
interdependence. Decision making is typically more than two levels above the project
team leader and resources have constantly been a struggle for this project. Additionally,
the organization does not have a good history with commercializing Skunk Works
projects. Project L has the most favorable organization ratings, given decision making
within two levels of the project leader, excellent access to resources and good history in
the commercialization of similar projects. Project P has high organizational
interdependence given access to resources and past success, but it also has a high
organizational uncertainty in that the project leader is greater than two levels away from
key decision makers.
The table below lists by project the actual organizational form along with the
organizational form proposed using the analysis recommended in this study.
Table 3.5: Analysis of Three Growth Projects - Organizational Form
Proj ect Actual Organizational Form Proposed Organizational Form
M Lightweight Team Autonomous Team
L Lightweight Team Lightweight Team
P Lightweight Team Heavyweight Team
Summarizing the categorization for each project, Project M has high uncertainty on all
three dimensions and low interdependence on two of the three dimensions. The fact that
technology interdependence is high is perhaps the only reason that this project is being
pursued in-house - suggesting perhaps an over-emphasis in technology and an under-
emphasis on market aspects in product development within the firm. In light of the above
analysis, the most effective organizational form for this application is clearly an
autonomous team that can leverage external development, through either a joint venture
or a spin out, most effectively. Given the early stage of this opportunity, the firm is
highly unlikely to capture value for its investment in the near term.
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Project L exhibits high interdependence in all three dimensions and low uncertainty in all
but technology. Given this categorization, internal development through a lightweight
team is the most reasonable organizational form to pursue development.
Project P exhibits high interdependence in technology and organization while exhibiting
low interdependence in markets. Coupled with high uncertainty in two of the three
dimensions (the exception being market), this categorization suggests that internal
development is most preferred through a heavyweight project team structure.
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Chapter 4: Survey of Non-Traditional Growth Projects
The primary motivation for this study was based upon the author's personal experiences
with projects dealing with different growth modes in a large, established firm seeking
non-traditional growth, as discussed in Chapter 3. However, I believe that the framework
and results presented in Chapter 3 may be extended beyond the projects discussed. To
test the applicability of this framework, a survey was designed and administered to 24
project leaders/managers involved with non-traditional growth in a single, large,
established firm. The survey was conducted in the form of personal interviews. Project
leaders/managers of non-traditional growth projects were expressly sought, with projects
defined as non-traditional revenue opportunities that meet the threshold criteria that (a)
each opportunity provides/provided the potential, given favorable outcomes, for greater
than $1 OOM in revenues by year five after commercial launch and (b) each opportunity
is/was focused on products and/or services that did not appear in or overlap with the five-
year product roadmaps of existing, established Business Units.
4.1 Survey Results
The survey comprised 15 questions, 14 of which were offered in a multiple-choice format
with the last question being open-ended. Appendix B provides a copy of survey questions
and the raw results data. A summary and analysis of this data is discussed in this section.
Efforts were made to obtain a sampling of projects and interviewees from R&D,
Manufacturing, and Marketing organizations within the firm, the three functions that
provide leadership for an overwhelming majority of non-traditional revenue
opportunities. The project leaders/managers were primarily selected from amongst the
author's network within the firm and through references offered by interviewees - as a
result of which, the results may be biased by the sampling process. The pie chart below
shows the distribution of the functional alignment of the interviewees. Although the
distribution is not even across the functions, I believe that the sampling distribution is
reasonable for this firm, when compared with the universe of actual project leadership
associated with growth projects. A majority of the project leaders are derived from the
R&D or Manufacturing functions. It is noted that in this particular firm, the applied R&D
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and Process R&D functions are aligned with the Manufacturing function rather than with
traditional R&D.
Fig 4.1: Interviewee Distribution by Organization
Mktg.
21%
R&D
41%
Mfg.
38%
Interviewees were asked to answer the questions based upon the results of a single non-
traditional growth project that they were involved with, regardless of how many they may
have been involved with previously. Project code names were obtained in each case to
ensure that the each interview results-set was unique, i.e., the results were not biased with
multiple results -sets, based upon the same project. There was no effort made to
distinguish between the stages of the project investigation/execution, i.e., the sampling of
projects ranged from completed projects to projects that were in the opportunity-
assessment phase to those in various stages of technology development and/or
commercialization. Potential sampling bias and the small number of interviewees are also
recognized as key limitations in generalizing the results of this survey.
A project is said to have been completed if there was a product launch (success) or if the
project was aborted (failure). It is noted also that there are specific instances when
aborting a project in an early phase of investigation could actually be considered a
success as opposed to a failure - this study is not sensitive to this characterization. Project
sizes varied from as few to as -5 full-time equivalents to as high as -25 full-time
equivalents.
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The questions were targeted toward creating a vector position for each project in the three
dimensional space mapped by the technology, market, and organizational factors specific
to the project. Within each dimension, questions were focused on getting a semi-
quantitative measure of uncertainty and interdependence. The survey responses were
converted to a scale of 100 for each factor by combining uncertainty and
interdependence. Appendix B provides a summary of the results and the numerical
conversion factors used.
The figure below summarizes the results as a function of technology, market, and
organizational factors. The blue circles correspond to projects that resulted in commercial
launch. The red squares correspond to projects that are in progress. The green diamonds
are projects that were stopped after a commercialization process began. The pink
triangles correspond to projects that were stopped prior to entering a commercialization
process.
Fig 4.2: Surveyed Project Results Plotted in 3-Dimensional Framework
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The "success" rate, where success is defined as commercial product launch (and not
related to marketplace success), is 46% (6 out of 13 completed projects) with 11 out of 24
projects in progress at the time of the interviews. Of the remainder of the completed
projects, 2 were halted after a commercialization process was begun, while 5 were halted
before a commercialization process was started.
From a technology perspective, a majority (75%) of the new growth projects require
inventions suggesting that the technical uncertainty is, for a significant majority of
projects, high. 46% (11/24) projects sampled require capital investments of greater than
$1 OM, requiring executive management approval. In all but one case, there was good or,
at least, some alignment between the project's technical requirements and the firm's core
competencies.
From a market perspective, 71% (17/24) of the projects had some or good definition of
customer needs. Only 38% (9/24) of the projects or just over half the projects with some
or good definition of customer needs, had good definition around market segmentation
and sales and distribution channel requirements. A significant 29% of the projects did not
have any assessment of customer needs, market segmentation, and sales channels. 33% of
the projects surveyed did not overlap significantly with the firm's existing markets and
sales and distribution channels with over half the remainder (10/16) having some overlap
with existing markets and channels.
From an organizational perspective, 19/24 projects or over 79% of the projects require
key decisions be made at least 2 levels higher than the level of the project
leader/manager. In 9/24 or 38% of the projects, the project leaders/managers were able to
cite an example project similar in uncertainty and interdependence to theirs that resulted
in commercial launch. In only 3/24 or 13% of the cases, were resources (team members,
funding, and equipment) very difficult to achieve.
Of the 24 projects samples, there were no projects that were run using a functional-team
structure and only one project run using an autonomous-team structure. A majority of the
projects (17/24 or 71%) were run using a lightweight team structure with the remaining
25% of the projects (6/24) being run using a heavyweight-team structure. A majority of
the projects (15/24 or 63%) worked in some fashion with external resources such as other
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firms, governmental agencies, and/or universities. Only 5 of the 24 projects surveyed did
not use a Kodak standard development or commercialization process. Of these, 3 were
completed over 3 years ago and the remainder are still in early-stage development (pre-
development process).
4.2 Analysis and Conclusions:
1. The firm's bias towards choosing tough technical challenges is clearly shown by
the fact that 75% of the projects require inventions. Recognizing that this may be
an artifact of the author's selection of interviewees, nevertheless, opportunities to
use existing technology in new applications and reduce the technical hurdles that
new non-traditional growth projects face may provide the firm with some
leverage.
2. A review of just the "successful" projects shows that of the projects sampled by
the survey, those that resulted in commercial launch all have relatively low
technology and market factors, as shown in the figure below. Of the successful
projects, the highest factor for both market and technology is only 30, while that
Fig 4.3: Survey Results - Market versus Technology Factors
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Fig 4.4: Survey Results - Organization versus Technology Factors
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A multiple regression analysis (performed using the statistical analysis software
package Statistica) of the completed projects yields the following results summarized in
the table below.
Table 4.1 :Multivariate Regression Summary
Regression Summary for Dependent Variable: SUCC
N = 13
R = .80193343
R2 = .64309722
Adjusted R2 = .52412963
F(3,9) = 5.4057
P <.02108
Std. Error of estimate: 32.908
BETA
Intercpt
TECH -.439272
MARKET -.497079
ORG -.073442
St. Err.
of BETA
.220249
.231936
.212396
B
116.8420
-.8052
-.9140
-.2126
St. Err.
of B
27.80888
.40371
.42647
.61486
t(9)
4.20161
-1.99443
-2.14317
-.34578
p-level
.002301
.077243
.060707
.737454
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Correlation coefficients are listed in the table below. Bivariate correlations
between project success and each of the dimensions - technology, market, and
organization, are also plotted. Clearly, each of the dimensions, which are composites of
uncertainty and interdependence, are inversely correlated with project success - the
higher the uncertainty and lower the interdependence, the lower the project success.
Market and Technology factors are both significant at the 90% confidence level, while
Organizational factors appear to be less significant. I believe that the lower significance
of Organizational factors is an artifact of the survey results, however, given the
predominance of a single organizational structure (i.e., lightweight teams comprise 71%
of the overall projects and 62% of the completed projects).
Table 4.2: Correlation Coefficients
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUCC
TECH -.638189
MARKET -.696648
ORG -.224251
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fig 4.5: Surveyed Project Success Correlated to Technology Factors
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Fig 4.6: Surveyed Project Success Correlated to Market Factors
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Fig 4.7: Surveyed Project Success Correlated to Organizational Factors
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3. A significant number of projects (11/24) require a sizeable capital investment.
Capital investments typically require long lead times for purchase, installation,
and commissioning and concomitant investments in advance of returns. The
higher risk in such cases, therefore, needs to be a key consideration when
considering a portfolio of growth projects. Senior management will want to be
involved in portfolio-balancing decisions wherein the growth portfolio is adjusted
according to capital availability, time horizon for investments, and acceptable
risk.
4. Large, technology-oriented firms that work in cross-disciplinary fields can claim
technology core-competencies in a significant array of disciplines. This is
evidenced by the fact that all the interviewees, regardless of technology
uncertainty, claimed at least some interdependence between the technology
requirements for the project and the firm's core competencies. For example, for a
company like Eastman Kodak Company that has traditionally been the world
leader of photographic science, core competencies extend from small particle
technology, synthetic chemistry, and polymer science to large-volume plastics
processing and specialized coating to image science and digital image processing
to optical device manufacturing (cameras, digital projectors, and printers). When
looking for new growth opportunities, such firms have a vast array of technology
strengths to rely upon. Careful selection of the technologies that provide
competitive differentiation while simultaneously affording growth in a risk-
managed portfolio of projects requires senior management involvement and
direction. In the absence of direct involvement from senior management, the
potential for a lack of focus can seriously undermine the entire project portfolio
by spreading existing resources too thinly.
5. From a market assessment perspective, there appears to be careful consideration
of customer needs in a majority of the projects (17/24). However, there appears to
be less consideration of how the product or solution will be delivered to the
customer (15/24). Business development needs a system perspective with careful
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consideration given to aspects of the business such as sales, logistics, etc., beyond
technology development and market assessment.
6. As technology competencies may be leveraged, market competencies such as
brand and supply chain/logistics functions may also be leveraged to a firm's
advantage. Only 6 out of the 24 projects claim strong market interdependence.
The survey results suggest, recognizing the potential bias through sample
selection, that an opportunity exists in taking advantage of market competencies
in a similar manner to the way the firm leverages technology competencies.
7. Decision-making authority appears to be removed from the project team with
19/24 (79%) of the projects requiring that key decisions be made at least two
levels above the project team manager. As well established in organization
behavioral studies, the hierarchical decision making structures reduce the speed of
decision-making while also reducing risk. For firms that are focused on non-
traditional growth, faster decision making and higher risk tolerance may be
desirable.
8. Resource availability does not seem to be a significant consideration in almost
90% (21/24) of the projects suggesting that current resource allocation processes
and efforts are adequate. Taken in concert with the extant decision-making
structures, the survey results seem to suggest that decision making may be a key
structural constraint in the system.
9. Only 9/24 (38%) of the project leaders/mangers were able to claim knowledge of
successful past project similar to theirs, suggesting an opportunity in popularizing
successes. This serves two purposes (a) improving morale and (b) providing the
impetus for the creation of informal networks and connections within the firm that
can serve to provide advice and guidance to project teams undertaking the
difficult task of new business growth.
10. A majority of the projects (17/24) employed the lightweight team structure
regardless of the technology, market, and organizational factors. This observation
supports one hypothesis of this study that firms default to using a single
organizational structure for development regardless of the task at hand. Clearly,
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based upon the discussion in the previous section of this study, there is a sizable
opportunity for this firm to create and utilize alternate team structures for new
business development and commercialization. The figure below shows the
projects factored into market, technology, and organizational factors as before but
color coded according to team structure - lightweight teams are shown as green
diamonds, heavyweight teams are shown as pink triangles, and autonomous teams
as red squares (there is only one project using an autonomous team and none
using functional teams). The liberal use of lightweight teams, regardless of the
combination of factors, is evident.
Fig 4.8: Surveyed Projects as a Function of Team Structure
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Using the framework developed in Chapter 3, it is possible to revisit the projects
listed to predict a more favorable organizational form, based upon the analysis
process developed in this study. Using the simplified hypothesis presented in
Section 3.2.1 (using only two dimensions, Market and Organization), I would
recommend that only 7 out of the 24 projects (instead of 17/24) be run using
Lightweight Teams, while 14 out of 24 projects be run using Heavyweight Teams
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(instead of 6/24) and 3 out of 24 projects be run using Autonomous Teams
(instead of 1/24). The actual and projected team structures as a function of vector
position are shown in the following figures.
Fig 4.9: Surveyed Projects as a Function of Team Structure - Actual
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Fig 4.10 Surveyed Projects as a Function of Team Structure - Proposed
3D.Categorized Graph - Projected
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11. Over 60% of the projects actively interfaced and used external resources. Given
increasing time pressures for new revenue growth, it is anticipated that external
partnerships that permit equitable value capture, will provide improved speed to
create and deliver value.
12. A majority of the projects were using the firm's standard commercialization
processes (19/24), suggesting that the benefits that accrue from similar structures
and language of development are being leveraged, i.e., when describing a project
as having passed Gate 2 of commercialization, a new team member is able to
quickly recognize the project status. Of the remainder of the projects, two pre-date
widespread rollout of the standard commercialization processes, while the other
three are currently active projects that are still in an early development and
exploratory mode.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Implementation Considerations
In Chapter 3 of this study, I propose a framework for growth, based upon structural
contingency theories, which characterizes opportunities using three key dimensions -
technology, market, and organization. Within each dimension, two key independent
factors are used - uncertainty and interdependence. Characterizing non-traditional growth
opportunities using this framework results in mapping each opportunity to a unique
vector within this space. The vector position of the opportunity at hand is linked to
organizational form, consistent with the underlying assumption of contingency theories
that organizational form must fit the task at hand, given strategic imperatives and
environmental conditions. In Chapter 4 of this study, I present the results of an empirical
survey conducted within a single, large firm wherein the survey explores the hypotheses
of this study. The survey results support the hypothesis that firms default to using a single
organizational form for projects regardless of the task at hand. The survey results also
support the hypothesis that project success is strongly correlated to technology and
market dimensions. As technology and/or market uncertainty increase and technology
and/or market interdependence decrease, the probability of project success decreases.
While the survey results seem to suggest that the organizational dimension is less well
correlated to project success, it is noted that the overwhelming use of a single
organizational form makes the data set poorly representative of the organizational
dimension.
A recommendation emerging from the theoretical and empirical work in this study is that
organizations must become more ambidextrous in their ability to use multiple
organizational forms simultaneously to exploit traditional and non-traditional growth
opportunities. Whereas traditional growth opportunities may leverage existing
organizational interdependencies, non-traditional growth opportunities will require
different organizational forms that exhibit superior commitment, focus, and speed. Large,
established firms will, therefore, have to learn to accommodate organizational forms that
are inherently inconsistent physically, structurally, and culturally - to enable operating in
multiple time frames with different interdependencies. In this chapter, I discuss key
implementation considerations that improve the firm's ability to engage in non-traditional
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growth activities. In order to frame the implementation considerations, it is necessary to
gain an understanding of product development processes that are being used for non-
traditional growth projects. In the following section, therefore, I provide a brief
introduction to a generic, integrated product development system. This is followed, in the
subsequent section, with a discussion on implementation considerations. Finally, I
present the conclusions of this study and potential future work opportunities to build
upon this study's results and conclusions.
5.1 The Generic Integrated Product Development System
A brief history of the product development processes used at Kodak is available in the
SDM thesis by Tom Mackin.(Mackin 2002) Starting in the early 1990s, Kodak
successively adopted and institutionalized detailed product development processes
including the Kodak Equipment Commercialization Process (KECP), followed by the
Kodak Manufacturing Commercialization Process (KMCP), followed by the Robust
Technology Development Process (RTDP). Each of these processes was quite successful
in delivering effective results in terms of improved product development success rates
and shortened time-to-market (TTM), as well as providing the company employees, as a
whole, with a common set of standards that spanned across functional or discipline-
specific development. However, there remained a problem in the late 1990s with products
failing in the marketplace, despite having been delivered on time and, often, within
budget. Such failures were linked to poor front-end opportunity identification and
assessment. Accordingly, following the recommendations of the product-development
consulting firm, PRTM, Kodak instituted, in late 2000, an integrated product
development system.
A generic view of an integrated product development system (IPS) is shown in Figure 5.1
below. The IPS is a collection of industry best practices that, together, form an enterprise-
wide, business development process. The IPS presents a logical set of processes and
activities that, done correctly and in a timely fashion, should result in a product
development system that is successful in terms of delivering the right products to the
marketplace, on time, and under-budget. It enables three primary benefits beyond those
of typical product development processes - a) better forecasts of product performance in
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the marketplace, b) management of a vital few instead of an overwhelming number, and
c) the identification and pursuit of sustainable vectors of differentiation. A Business
Decision Team comprising of key decision makers representing a Strategic Product
Group or Business Unit, Marketing, Operations, and R&D, as well as the necessary
functional managers (such as finance, etc.) coordinates the set of product development
activities guided by the firm's core strategic vision and BU strategy. Key elements of the
IPS include the Market Attack plan (MAP), Product Platform plans (PPP), and the
Technology Development plan (TDP). The MAP process comprises a set of planning
activities that evaluates market opportunities and plans a coordinated strategy that is
aligned with corporate and BU goals. Since insufficient management time and attention
devoted to product development is known to be one of the critical causes of product
development failures, the front-end processes, allow management to focus on key
platform decisions instead of individual product decisions, thus reducing the entities
actually being managed (often by an order of magnitude - from 1 00s to 1 Os, as shown in
Figure 5.2), in turn allowing increased focus and attention on those being managed.
Product platforms are a collection of common elements, especially the underlying
defining technology, implemented across a range of products. Where the MAP is a
vertical strategy, enabling the definition of opportunities in a single market, PPP is a
horizontal strategy, enabling the application of technology to multiple markets.
Technology development plans (TDP) complement the MAP and PPP by enabling the
timely development of core technologies and inventions in support of the MAP and PPP.
Product development that is appropriately planned through the proper utilization of the
front-end processes, proceeds through commercialization, and through a phased
stage/gate process.
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Fig 5.1: Integrated Product Development System
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The IPS provides a logical and thorough process for product line extensions and new
product introductions that are aligned with core BU strategy. A product concept or
customer need can be quickly and efficiently moved through the front-end processes
(MAP and PPP) because of the easy access to established market and platform data.
Technology development is aligned with existing needs in anticipating and working on
new product and process technologies that support next-generation commercial
introductions. The function and architecture of the Business Decision Team is also
straightforward - because their roles and responsibilities are well defined. Such product
development activities tend to enter commercialization fairly quickly with relatively
predictable schedules and budgets.
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Fig 5.2: Front-End Planning Elements
5.2 Implementation Considerations
Non-traditional growth opportunities present a set of unique challenges in addition to the
usual challenges facing traditional growth opportunities. Large firms have to consciously
rise up to the challenges of non-traditional growth in addition to existing operational
challenges. These additional challenges include:
(a) Alignment and fit with the firm's strategic objectives - Non-traditional growth
opportunities are, by definition, outside the firm's existing SBU strategic foci. As
a default therefore, it is imperative that such opportunities receive the explicit
approval of senior management early in their progression, before heavy
commitment of time and resources. Early validation, followed by periodic
verification, by senior management may also be necessary to ensure that new
business opportunities continue to evolve within the framework set forth by the
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corporate strategic vision. Early validation requires the assumption of some level
of risk by senior management, as it is highly unlikely that detailed planning will
be possible in the early stages of opportunity assessment.
(b) Processes for new growth development, including organizational structures,
mechanistic processes, and incentives - New business development beyond the
early-opportunity assessment phase needs to be able to execute mechanistic
business processes such as order entry, order fulfillment, billing, supply chain,
and logistics, etc. For traditional opportunities, existing infrastructure is available
to be leveraged. This may or may not be true for non-traditional growth
opportunities. Infrastructure and business process development is expensive and
time consuming. Clearly, early recognition of these needs and activities can
ensure they're pre-planned.
(c) Clearly defined roles and responsibilities - During the early stages of opportunity
assessment, resource availability is typically limited. In the case of traditional
growth opportunities, existing knowledge bases are available as are suitable
human resources who, despite limited engagement, are able to provide the
necessary information. In the case of non-traditional business opportunities
however, since existing knowledge bases are limited, it is often necessary for a
small team of resources to focus simultaneously on technical, market, and
business development functions. It is often not possible, in such phases of
activity, to clearly demarcate roles and responsibilities within a small resource
team - some flexibility and entrepreneurial culture is therefore necessary.
(d) Access to resources and priority over traditional growth projects - The inherently
higher risk associated with non-traditional growth opportunities makes
prioritizing them relative to traditional growth opportunities difficult, particularly
for shared resources. However, if accommodations are not made, traditional
opportunities will always look better on conventional financial metrics such as
NPV measures, and as such, will dominate the use of shared resources at the
expense of non-traditional opportunities.
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Taken in combination with the framework presented in Chapter 3 and the survey results
presented in Chapter 4, several implementation considerations emerge for non-traditional
growth opportunities in large firms. I discuss these specifically in the context of the
existing integrated product development process. The key considerations are:
a) Senior Management integration - For reasons including strategic alignment,
resource allocation and prioritization, and on-going support, senior management
involvement as champions, is critical to non-traditional business growth. Through
their actions, senior management sets a clear tone regarding the relative priority of
activities in the firm. For non-traditional growth-related activities to survive
organizational antibodies and overcome organizational inertia, active support
from senior executives is an imperative. From a project perspective, the need for
the governing BDT architecture to include a senior executive champion is
emphasized.
b) Organizational structure - There are compelling arguments in the literature for
non-traditional business development to be undertaken in differentiated
organizations that are removed from the existing organizational structures.
(Christensen 1997; Leifer, O'Connor et al. 2001) However, there are also studies
that show that excessive separation of organizational structures imposes distinct
disadvantages such as the inability to leverage needed resources from the
mainstream organization and the inability to integrate operations back into the
mainstream organization after the opportunity under consideration attains a
critical mass. (Westerman, lansiti et al. 2002) Additionally, the beneficial cultural
effects of the non-traditional growth opportunity on the larger organization as a
whole are lost without integration at some level. Some integration, at least at a
tactical level, therefore, is necessary for projects to be able to leverage existing
competencies and capabilities. Insofar as interdependencies exist and are
synergistic, integration, at a suitable level, is an imperative. The formation an a
New Business Ventures organization that straddles traditional R&D,
Manufacturing and Marketing functions in the firm, is recommended.
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c) Organizational integration and incentives alignment: Given tactical integration
between the new business opportunity and the mainstream organizations,
however, it is critically important that organizational antibodies do not sub-
optimize and emphasize lower risk, traditional opportunities at the expense of
non-traditional growth opportunities. Accordingly, a reconsideration of incentives
- to align functional and operational managers incentives and behaviors with the
need to deliver non-traditional growth - is critical to the success of such ventures.
Common Incentives based upon cross-platform growth/common-fate results are
necessary.
d) Resource allocation and utilization: The primary focus of this study has been at
the project level. The need to match team structures to task contingencies has
been emphasized through the examples and results cited. The opportunity to use
heavyweight teams more effectively in this particular large firm is emphasized by
the survey results. An additional benefit through the use of heavyweight and
autonomous teams is the reduced occurrence of key project resources being
shared across multiple projects, limiting their effectiveness and project progress.
Queueing theory models in operations research show unambiguously that
resources loaded to more than 70% of their capacity cause exponentially
increasing delays.(Nahmias 2001) Increased use of teams with members that have
exclusive alignment and commitment to the project at hand reduces instances of
resource overload. An appropriately functioning BDT and a senior management
champion can be a powerful influence on relative prioritization to ensure suitable
resource allocation.
e) Business Process modifications: As with any early-stage opportunity
development, the uncertainties in technology and market, as well as in
organization. are typically high. A small but committed team of cross-functional
individuals to assess these opportunities is highly desirable. Using the frameworks
developed in this study, for reasons related to ambiguity in roles and
responsibilities, as well as in alignment of priorities and incentives, these teams
are most efficient when structured as heavyweight teams as opposed to other
organizational forms. Since new opportunity assessment has a high probability of
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abandonment, the support framework around new opportunity assessment
processes such as budgeting and resource allocation processes, need to be
flexible. Annual budgeting cycles serve continuously evolving new business
opportunities poorly.(Hura 2002)
5.3 Future Work
The following are additional elements that build upon the hypotheses and results
in this study:
a) This study has primarily focused on non-traditional growth opportunity
characterization at the project level. Extensions of this study conducted at the
SBU level will bring in additional levels of complexity including portfolio
management issues and prioritization considerations across different time
horizons.
b) This study did not include any examples of corporate ventures, joint ventures,
or acquisitions. Clearly, these represent other growth modes available to large,
established firms and contain other task contingencies that impact
organizational form. Future studies that include these other growth modes will
build upon the conclusions drawn here.
c) This study has focused on a single, large firm and the non-traditional growth
issues it faces. As such, the examples, survey results and subsequent analysis
may not be generalizable. Expanding this study across multiple large firms
will help verify the applicability of the conclusions drawn here to more
general situations.
d) While the survey method used in this study attempted to get at the results of
projects conducted over a period of time, nevertheless, the methods used here
focused on a snapshot perspective rather than an evolutionary perspective. A
future study wherein a few of multiple projects are influenced by the
framework and hypotheses on the organizational form proposed here and the
impacts explored in real time will provide a more comprehensive set of
methods in evaluating the framework presented here.
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Appendix A
A.1: System Dynamics Simulation Modeling -
A system dynamics model at the project level is used to complement the survey results
presented earlier in this study and develop a quantitative understanding of the relative
impact of factors such as opportunity-selection filters, resource availability, resource
capability, decision-making structures, and expectations on project performance. Model
results suggest that key improvements through reducing organizational complexity and
improving speed and efficiency of uncertainty reduction can improve project completion
times by over 50%. In turn, organizational complexity is reduced by matching the task
contingency to the team structure using the process suggested in this study while the
speed of uncertainty reduction is increased by working with structures that reduce such
factors as communication overhead and staff turnover, and improve decision-making
speed by working with the correct levels of management as dictated by the need for
capital and other key strategic decisions needed to progress the project.
A.1.1: An Introduction to Learning through System Dynamics Modeling:
All learning depends upon feedback. The double loop shown below has been cited in
fields such as psychology, sociology, and anthropology as well as in physics,
engineering, and economics as to being the most basic type of learning for humans and
for "intelligent" machines.(Sterman 2000)
Fig A. 1: Learning through Feedback
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We make decisions governing system performance based on our mental models of how
the system works. The results of our decisions are available as information feedback. The
link in red shows learning that occurs when information feedback from the real world
reinforces or alters our mental models. As our mental models change, we make different
decisions, which alter the structure of our systems, yielding different patterns of behavior.
Barriers exist, however, which can adversely affect the learning process. These include
dynamic complexity of the systems - multi-loop and multi-state non-linearity, imperfect
information about the state of the real world, confounding and ambiguous variables, poor
scientific reasoning skills, defensive routines, implementation failure, etc.(Sterman 2000)
To overcome these barriers, we resort to simulations of virtual worlds of known structure
and complexity, which offer accurate implementation of policy decisions that result in
immediate and accurate feedback. Learning occurs by analogy - mapping the feedback
structure and analyzing the dynamic responses in comparison with those of the real
world.
Similar learning concepts have been extended from the level of an individual to that of an
organization. The concept of dynamic capabilities, defined by Teece (Teece, Pisano et al.
1997) as a firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external
competencies to address rapidly changing environments, builds upon prior work on core
competencies and forms a major focus of recent theorizing in strategic management and
organizational theory. Zollo and Winter (Zollo and Winter 2002) define dynamic ability
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as a learned and stable pattern of collective activity through which an organization
systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in pursuit of improved
effectiveness. Regardless of the precise definition, however, it is clear that firms which
have a goal of achieving growth need to exhibit strong dynamic capabilities - they need
to embody patterns of activity that are aimed at the generation and adaptation of
operating routines to changing environments.
Organizational learning occurs through three primary mechanisms - experience
accumulation - which is the focus of much traditional literature as skill building based
upon the repeated execution of similar tasks; knowledge articulation - important for
collective learning that happens when individuals express opinions and beliefs in a
constructive confrontation; and knowledge codification - beyond articulation,
codification requires that individuals document their learning in appropriate systems,
exposing the logical steps of their arguments and unearthing hidden assumptions to make
causal linkages explicit. Articulation and codification require specific costs - direct costs
in terms of time, resources, opportunity costs, and managerial attention in the
development and updating of task-specific tools, and indirect costs including the potential
inappropriate application of routines, and the more general increase in organizational
inertia consequent to formalization and structuring of task execution. The benefits of
articulation and codification clearly need to overcome the associated costs. Typically,
organizations have done poorly in knowledge articulation and codification because of
under appreciation of the benefits and over estimation of costs.
However, taking a step back from knowledge and focusing specifically on tasks, it is
possible to delineate tasks based upon frequency, heterogeneity, and degree of causal
ambiguity. Zollo and Winter (Zollo and Winter 2002) argue that the lower the frequency
of tasks, the higher the likelihood that explicit articulation and codification will exhibit
stronger effectiveness in developing dynamic capabilities as compared with tacit
accumulation of past experiences. Additionally, the higher the heterogeneity of tasks and
task experiences, the higher the likelihood that explicit articulation and codification will
exhibit stronger effectiveness in developing dynamic capabilities. Lastly, the higher the
degree of causal ambiguity, the higher the likelihood is that explicit articulation and
codification will exhibit stronger effectiveness in developing dynamic capabilities.
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Codification efforts force the drawing of explicit conclusions about the action
implications of experience, something that articulation alone does not do. It should aim at
transferring "know why" as well as "know how." Timing is a key ingredient - too early
or too late will significantly alter value delivered. Insofar as the codified knowledge is re-
used and modified, it continues to add value. System dynamics models offer a dynamic
codification scheme and, as such, form a key part of organizational learning.
The fundamental premise of system dynamics models is that the behavior of a system
arises from its structure. This structure consists of feedback loops, stocks and flows, and
non-linearities that are created by the interaction of the structure of the system with the
decision-making processes of agents acting within it.(Sterman 2000) The dynamic
behavior of any system can be modeled by combinations of three fundamental behavior
modes - exponential-growth dynamics that arise through positive feedback, goal-seeking
dynamics that arise through negative feedback, and oscillations that arise from negative
feedback with time delays.(Sterman 2000) System dynamics models of organizational
capability that mimic real performance thus provide powerful tools for organizational
learning and testing the results of policy.
A.1.2: System Dynamics and Organizational Capability:
System Dynamics (SD) has been used to study research and development (R&D)
processes and phenomena associated with R&D organizations, such as resource
allocation among projects and the interrelation between R&D and the total
corporation.(Roberts 1978) For example, Repenning and Sterman (Repenning and
Sterman 2000) discuss the structure of process improvement initiatives within
organizations. The causal loop diagram used in their study is shown below. The actual
performance of any process depends upon the amount of Time Spent Working and the
Capability of the process. Typically, time spent on improving process capability yields
more enduring results than time spent working. However, there is usually a delay in
uncovering root causes of problems and/or learning new capabilities and then going
forward and implementing. The lag in enhancing capability depends on the technical and
organizational complexity of the process with the delay for simpler processes such as
yield of machines in a job shop of the order of months while the delay for more complex
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processes such as product development processes can be several years. The Performance
Gap is the difference between actual performance and performance expectations.
Typically, expectations exceed performance. In order to close the performance gap,
people need to work harder (increase the Time Spent Working) or work smarter (Time
Spent on Improvement). The Pressure to do work and the Pressure to improve capability
reflects the direct and indirect measures used by management to achieve improved
results. Unfortunately, working smarter does have limitations (a) there is a delay in
achieving results, and (b) there is a greater risk that the improvement efforts fail to hit the
mark directly (particularly with increasing process complexity). Given increasing
pressure for relatively short-term results, the Time Spent Working is increased at the
expense of Time Spent on Inprovement, resulting in two more loops. A positive
feedback loop that reinforces the dominant behavior arises - with increasing performance
gap, the pressure to do work increases, decreasing the Time Spent on Improvement,
decreasing the Investments in Capability, decreasing Capability, decreasing Actual
Performance, and further increasing the Performance Gap. There is also the increasing
pressure to spend more time working and less time on improvements - the balancing loop
shown in red below. With an increasing Performance Gap, pressure to do work increases,
resulting in a decrease in Time Spent on Improvement and an increase in the Time Spent
Working. Repenning and Sterman call the interaction between the above reinforcing and
balancing loops the "capability trap." In the short term, managers and workers can get an
immediate performance boost by skimping on longer-term activities (for example, to
offset efficiency losses, spend more time working than on preventative maintenance).
Capability declines with time however, causing the eventual shift to a more and more
short-term focus and poorer results (efficiency continues to take hits as the absence of
preventative maintenance results in more and more breakdowns). The capability trap goes
beyond low capability and high work pressure - eventually it gets embedded in the
corporate culture and incentives as organizations that grow more dependent upon fire-
fighting, reward, and promote "heroes," To successfully navigate the capability trap, an
organization needs to (a) recognize that performance typically may deteriorate over the
short-term as a result of a longer-term focus on capability improvement, and (b) invest in
additional resources, which may raise costs in the short term, pays off in the long term.
Suresh Sunderrajan, SDM Thesis 12/18/2003Page 104
The reinforcing loop dynamics have to begin reinforcing virtuous capability improvement
rather than the vicious working harder cycle for the organization to emerge from the
Capability Trap.
Fig A.2: Repenning Capability Trap
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Recent literature in SD has focused on project dynamics. The focus on single project
models has been attributed, at least partly, to their dramatic success in correlating the
models to real world project performance.(Ford and Sterman 1998) The origin of the
project model described below and modified later for use in this study was in the disputed
claim between the Navy, and shipbuilding contractor, Ingalls of Pascagoula, Mississippi.
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(Cooper 1980). The key element in the project model is the rework cycle, shown in the
figure below.
Fig A.3: Key Elements of the Project Model
Staff Productivity Quality
Work to be I \ - Work
Done Work being DoneRelyDn
KnownUndiscovered
Rewrk ReworkRework Discovery
Initially, all tasks related to the project are in the stock entitled Work to be Done. Tasks
are completed as a function of the staff available and the productivity and quality of their
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work. Tasks may be completed correctly - resulting in Work Really Done, or incorrectly,
resulting in Undiscovered Rework. Work quality is typically low for projects that involve
high degrees of uncertainty. Cooper and Mullen (Cooper and Mullen 1993) found that the
average fraction of work done correctly the first time in their sample to be 68% for
commercial projects. As errors are discovered, typically later in the project cycle, tasks
move from Undiscovered Rework to Known Rework. Additionally, changes in customer
requirements (or changes that arise from improved understanding of customer
requirements) result in tasks moving from the stock Work Really Done to the stock
Known Rework. Known Rework now adds to Work to be Done, requiring additional
resources to complete the project.
The ultimate effect of rework is to delay project completion. As the project falls behind
schedule, however, several other harmful side effects begin to impact the project
progress. The effect of prior work quality has an impact on the quality of current work in
complex projects - poor early work quality results in poor current work quality. Schedule
pressure can increase productivity through overtime work; however, work quality suffers
as overtime results in fatigue and burnout. Additional staff can be (and is normally)
added to the project staff but the dilution of the experience base that results affects both
work productivity and quality adversely.
Single-project models do not effectively model the tradeoffs that are critical in multiple
project environments. The dynamics of multiple project management has been the focus
of some current literature. Repenning (Repenning 2000) presents a dynamic model of a
multi-project product development system and, by capturing the dynamics of resource
allocation among competing projects in different phases of development, shows the
existence of a "tipping point" in an organization's product development effectiveness. An
increase in workload that exceeds capacity by as little as 25% is sufficient to push an
otherwise robust organization into a vicious cycle of fire fighting. Once the system enters
a fire-fighting mode, absent additional intervention, it never recovers. McQuarrie
(McQuarrie 2002) uses the framework suggested by Repenning to discuss the impact of
fire fighting in Aerospace Product Development. He suggests that the most important
factors in improving an organization's capacity to successfully execute projects is to
improve project bids, proposals, and plans so they are consistent with the true scope and
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available resources. The important levers that management has are (a) slipping projects
earlier rather than later by recognizing execution issues early, and (b) provision of
resource reserves that are beyond planned project levels.
There are relatively few studies of organizational growth and transformation using
system dynamics. Weil and White (Weil and White 1994) present a system dynamics
model of business transformation focused on the healthcare industry - specifically, how
managed care will grow and replace the traditional health insurance business and the
policies that a dominant company in the traditional health insurance business should
adopt to emerge as a leader in a radically different business. They draw from their model
several conclusions that are widely applicable. Substantial sacrifice in near-term
profitability is required to launch the new business properly because of the need for
aggressive investment in anticipation of volume growth. The vectors of differentiation in
the new business should be based on product attractiveness and service quality, not price
(to slow commoditization and enhance returns that are crucial for successful
transformation). Last but not least, they emphasize the need to maintain product
attractiveness in the core business through the transformation to maintain cross-
subsidization through the transformation.
A.2: Objectives of SD Modeling in this Study:
In this study, I use a system dynamics model at the project level to investigate non-
traditional growth in large firms. Specifically, in Table 3.1, I list the common causes of
failure to achieve non-traditional growth in large firms at a system level and at a project
level. In this section, I try to get a quantitative understanding of the relative impact of
factors such as opportunity selection filters, resource availability, resource capability,
decision-making structures, and expectations on project performance. Additionally, in the
first section of this study, I presented a framework to characterize opportunities for
growth based upon market, technology, and organizational uncertainty, and market,
technology, and organizational interdependence. In this section, I use a system dynamics
model to understand the relative impact of these factors on key project metrics such as
total effort required for project completion, productivity and quality by explicitly
modeling the opportunity assessment factors in a complex project model.
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A.2.1: A Breakdown of Model Dynamics:
The central dynamics at the project level is analogous to the Rework Generation loop in
the classic Project Dynamics model (Cooper 1980) (Lyneis 2002). At a project-level,
there exist a set of uncertainties, classified separately in the earlier section of this study as
technology, market, and organization, that need to be resolved (Uncertainties to be
Resolved) in order to exploit the opportunity under consideration. Uncertainties are
resolved through a Resolution process - the flow that connects the stocks from
Uncertainties to be Resolved to Uncertainties Resolved. Uncertainties Resolved lead to
the creation of new Undiscovered Uncertainties through the Learning process.
Undiscovered Uncertainties are now added to the Uncertainties to be Resolved through
the Discovery flow.
Fig A.4: Project Model Modified for Uncertainty Resolution
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Additionally, the very process of defining the Uncertainties to be Resolved typically
results in the Creation of Undiscovered Uncertainties as the early definition of an
opportunity is subject to significant change as uncertainties are resolved.
Uncertainty resolution progress depends the Quality and Productivity of the resolution
process. The Quality of resolution is a function of the factors shown in the figure below.
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Fig A.5 Factors Affecting Quality of Uncertainty Resolution
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Normal quality (uncertainties/month) is the quality of uncertainty resolution under
"normal" conditions where the interactions from other effects are negligible. However,
there are numerous dynamic effects that have a substantial and ongoing effect on the
quality of uncertainty resolution. These include (a) the effect of experience - the lower
the experience of the project team, the poorer the quality of uncertainty resolution; (b) the
effect of schedule pressure - the tighter the schedule constraints, the poorer the quality of
uncertainty resolution; (c) the effect of prior uncertainty resolution - the poorer the
quality of the early work, the slower the actual rate of uncertainty resolution because of
the impact of the early work on the later efforts; (d) the effect of organizational factors
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such as organizational receptivity to new ideas, decision-making processes, and project
team influence - the higher the organizational uncertainty and lower the organizational
independence, the higher the organizational complexity coefficient, the poorer the
quality; (e) the effect of technology factors such as technology alignment with core
capabilities, reliance on external resources etc. - the higher the technology uncertainty
and lower the technology interdependence, the higher the technology complexity
coefficient, the poorer the quality; and (f) the effect of market factors such as market
overlap, sales and distribution channel familiarity, etc. - the higher the market
uncertainty and lower the market interdependence, the higher the market complexity
factor, the poorer the quality of uncertainty resolution.
The Productivity of Uncertainty Resolution is a function of the factors shown in the
figure below.
Fig A.6 Factors Affecting Productivity of Uncertainty Resolution
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Normal Productivity is the productivity of uncertainty resolution under "normal"
conditions where the interactions from other effects are negligible. Uncertainty resolution
productivity is however a function of several dynamic interaction effects. These include:
(a) the effect of experience - the lower the experience of the project team, the poorer the
productivity of uncertainty resolution; (b) the effect of schedule pressure - the tighter the
schedule constraints, the higher the productivity of uncertainty resolution; (c) the effect
of organizational factors such as organizational response speed and decision-making
processes - the higher the organizational uncertainty and lower the organizational
interdependence, the poorer the productivity; (d) the effect of technology factors such as
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the availability of suitable equipment and relevant technical expertise, etc. - the higher
the technology uncertainty and lower the technology interdependence, the poorer the
productivity; and (e) the effect of market factors such as market overlap, sales and
distribution channel familiarity etc. - the higher the market uncertainty and lower the
market interdependence, the poorer the productivity of uncertainty resolution.
Model dynamics affect the Quality and Productivity of uncertainty resolution. I assume
here that superior uncertainty resolution is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
successful new growth.
A.2.2: Resource Allocation Dynamics:
In addition to the above dynamics, the model also uses a simple resource allocation
system. The figure below summarizes the staffing model used - a linear first-order,
negative-feedback system that exhibits goal-seeking behavior. Total staff is the sum of
new staff and experienced staff. An estimate of the staff required is provided at the
beginning of the project. The difference between the staff required and the total staff on
the project causes staff to be hired. There are two key time delays in the system - a delay
to hire new staff and a delay for new staff to become experienced staff. The hiring delay
corresponds to the average time an organization takes to identify staffing needs,
determine required skills, and execute the hiring process. The experience delay
corresponds to the average time that it takes for new project team members to become
familiar with their roles, responsibilities, and team processes that are necessary for them
to contribute fully.
Fig A.7 Resource Allocation Dynamics
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The two time delays in the system result in staffing fulfillment that is significantly longer
than intuitively expected. Whereas the time delays are each set at 3 months, the time to
get to the full staffing complement per the requirements, set initially at 20, is much
longer. As shown below, it takes over 12 months to reach the staff level required.
Additionally, because experienced staff has higher quality and productivity than new
staff, it is desirable to increase the experience ratio (ratio of experienced staff to total
project staff) of the project team. As shown below, it takes over 18 months for the
experience ratio to approach 1. The result of these two delays is significant under
resourcing of projects, particularly in the early days of the project. Under resourcing, in
turn, results in a slower rate of progress than desired, increasing the impact of schedule
pressure on quality and productivity.
Fig A.8 Total Staff as a Function of Time
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Fig A.9 Experience Ratio as a Function of Time
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A. 2.3: Model Calibration:
Model inputs were calibrated to firm-specific values that were determined empirically.
Interviews were conducted of ten project leaders/managers of new business development
projects in a single, large, established firm and the average of their responses used for key
model parameters. It is emphasized that the model parameters are based upon
guesstimates based upon the experience of those interviewed (and can be tuned for a
specific project with project-specific inputs), however, the model results are sufficiently
general in a relative sense to be meaningful.
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A.3: Model Results:
I explicitly model the effects of market, technology, and organizational complexity,
where the complexity factor is a combination of uncertainty and interdependence defined
in Chapter 3 of this study. Several combinations of market, technology, and
organizational complexity are modeled - the table below provides a summary of the
scenarios simulated. It is reasonable to expect that non-traditional growth opportunities in
large firms be characterized by at least one high complexity factor amongst market,
technology, and organization. The scenarios considered compare the impact of
complexity on project metrics including Productivity, Quality, Uncertainty Resolution,
and Cumulative Effort Expended.
Table A. 1: Market, Technology and Organization Complexity
Factor Market Technology Organization
Low Complexity - M, T, 0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Medium Complexity - M, T, 0 0.5 0.5 0.5
High Complexity - M 0.9 0.5 0.5
Medium Complexity - T, 0
High Complexity - M, T 0.9 0.9 0.5
Medium Complexity - 0
High Complexity - M, T, 0 0.9 0.9 0.9
The figures below show, respectively, productivity, quality, cumulative effort expended,
and uncertainties resolved, for each of the scenarios above. The effect on productivity
and quality as a function of complexity has a significant effect on the cumulative effort
expended and the uncertainties resolved. Increasing the complexity from low to high
changes the uncertainty resolution time from less than 21 months to over 204 months.
The complexity factor has a compounding effect on the cumulative effort expended to
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resolve the initial uncertainties, changing the cumulative effort required from 1314
person *months for a single high-complexity factor (market only) to 1622
person *months for two high-complexity factors (market and technology - an increase
of 23% in the effort necessary) to 2704 person *months for all three high-complexity
factors (an increase of-106% in the effort necessary). From the perspective that non-
traditional growth projects are typically under considerable schedule pressure as well as
budget pressure to deliver revenues, this translates into decisions that are typically made
with more unresolved uncertainties for projects that deal with multiple high complexities
simultaneously. In turn, this reduces an already low probability of success for such
projects.
Fig A. 10: Productivity as a Function of Time for Different Project Complexities
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Fig A. 11: Quality as a Function of Time for Different Project Complexities
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Fig A. 12: Uncertainties Resolved as a Function of Time
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Fig A. 13: Project Completion Date as a Function of Time
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This highlights the importance of careful selection of growth opportunities and the
importance of selecting within a portfolio ofprojects those project that provide maximum
probability of success through (a) organizational uncertainty reduction, (b) appropriate
resourcing, and (c) portfolio planning in keeping with resourcing needs.
Given the reality that non-traditional growth opportunities are typically characterized by
high complexities on at least one of the three factors, it is important to consider the
options available to firms that need to work with such projects. The following options are
available:
a) minimizing the impact of schedule pressure by increasing the willingness to slip
schedule,
b)
c)
decreasing the time taken for new hires to gain experience,
reducing staff turnover,
d) increasing the availability of project staff through hiring,
e) decreasing the time taken to discover uncertainties, and
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f) changing decision-making efficiency through reduced organizational complexity.
The impact of each of the above factors and the cumulative impact of all of these
factors on key project metrics is presented below for a single scenario where the
market complexity factor is high (0.9) and the technology and organizational factors
are medium (0.5, 0.5). Subsequently, I discuss how each of these may be
accomplished in conjunction with the existing new business development processes in
a large firm.
Table A.2: Scenario Analysis
Project
Completion Date
- months (Effect
Factor Base Case Scenarios
on Cumulative
Effort Expended
- person*months)
Base Case 138 (230)
Willingness to Slip Willingness to Slip Willingness to Slip 122 (205)
Schedule = 0 = 1
Time to Gain Time to Gain Time to Gain 123 (230)
Experience Experience = 2.5 Experience = 1.0
months months
Turnover Staff Leaving Staff Leaving 109 (576)
Delay = 1 Months Delay = 4 Month
Exp. Staff Willingness to Hire Willingness to Hire 110 (2474)
Exp. Staff= 0; Exp. Staff = 1;
Exp. Staff Hired = Exp. Staff Hired
0 =0.2* Extra Staff
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Maximum Time to
Discover
Uncertainties = 8
months; Minimum
Time to Discover
Uncertainties = 1
month
Needed
Maximum Time to
Discover
Uncertainties = 4
months; Minimum
Time to Discover
Uncertainties = 0.5
month
53 (298)
Organizational Organizational Organizational 81(433)
Complexity Complexity = 0.5 Complexity = 0.1
Cumulative All of the above All of the above 49 (895)
Cumulative (No All of the above All of the above 50 (208)
Hiring) except Willingness
to Hire = 0
The table above summarizes the results of 8 scenarios that reduce the project
completion date starting with a base case completion date of 138 months. In each of
the scenarios considered, all of the uncertainties are resolved over the duration of the
simulation run. The improvements in order of increasing effectiveness by shortening
the time for project completion are:
a) reducing the time for new project staff to gain experience,
increasing the willingness to slip schedule early,
being willing to hire staff as needed,
reducing staff turnover,
e) reducing organizational complexity, and
f) reducing the time to discover uncertainties.
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In addition to the above, two scenarios include a combination of the above individual
effects. In one case, the cumulative scenario includes all of the above and in the other,
it includes all of the above but the willingness to hire staff as needed. The project
completion date is the shortest for the former.
In addition to the project completion date, the other key metric is the cumulative
effort expended. Clearly, from the results in the table above and the figures below, the
willingness to hire results in a significant increase in the number of new hires and in
the number of person months of cumulative effort necessary to complete the project.
Reducing staff turnover also has the impact of increasing the cumulative effort while
reducing the project completion time.
Fig A. 14: Cumulative Effort Expended - Scenario Analysis
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Fig A. 15: Uncertainties Resolved - Scenario Analysis
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Fig A. 16: Project Completion Date - Scenario Analysis
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Fig A. 17: Total Project Staff - Scenario Analysis
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A.4 Discussion:
The simulation results suggest the following impacts on policy:
a) Clearly the largest impact on project completion date is from the time to discover
uncertainties. Reducing the time to discover uncertainties by a factor of 2
decreases the project completion time from 138 months to 53 months, a factor of
2.6, while increasing cumulative effort by only 30%. Uncertainty discovery can
be accelerated using such product-development best practices such as rapid
prototyping and concurrent engineering. Several books and articles on product
development processes affirm the benefits of such practices.(Smith and
Reinertsen 1991) (Ulrich and Eppinger 2000) (Wheelwright and Clark)
b) The next largest impact on the project completion date is from reducing the
organizational complexity. The first section of this study is focused on this
variable. Matching the project complexity, factored into uncertainty and
interdependence, with organizational structures that are best aligned with
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complexity resolution has the effect of reducing organizational complexity,
which, in turn, reduces the time to completion. The simulation results suggest that
for the scenario considered, reducing organizational complexity from 0.5 to 0.1
reduces the time to project completion by over 40%.
c) Reducing staff turnover, which increases the number of experienced staff working
on the project, reduces the project completion time. Particularly for complex
projects, which last for multiple years, staff turnover has a very significant effect
on knowledge loss and subsequent re-work ultimately results in project delays and
over-stretched budgets. Clear commitment to goals by staff and by management,
appropriate reward structures, and well-defined milestones and project objectives,
have a significant impact on reducing staff turnover.
d) Willingness to hire staff, both new staff and experienced staff, also has a
significant impact on reducing project completion time. Willingness to hire results
in a significant difference in the total number of project staff. Whereas in the base
case, total project staff equilibrates at a fairly low level, as shown in the figure
below, in the scenario wherein we're willing to hire, it equilibrates at the
maximum allowable level for much of the duration of the project. Continuous
hiring results in a much higher cumulative effort because a lot of the effort is
related to newly hired staff climbing a learning curve, over which time their work
productivity and work quality is low. Poor work quality, in turn, generates more
rework - increasing the cumulative number of uncertainties resolved over the
project duration, shown in the figure below. The simulation results suggest that
hiring practices for projects need to be carefully examined to understand the
productivity versus quality tradeoffs. For complex projects, early hiring to fill
anticipated needs concomitant with low staff turnover provide for the soonest
completion dates. These need to be managed, however, with conflicting budget-
related issues, learning curve navigation, and communication overhead.
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Fig A. 18: Cumulative Uncertainties Resolved - Willingness to Hire
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e) Increasing the willingness to slip schedule early, decreases schedule pressure
effects on productivity and quality. Increasing schedule pressure has a short-term
effect on increasing productivity. However, staff fatigue and burnout become
issues if schedule pressure is maintained for a significant period. This results in
poorer quality, which ultimately increases the amount of rework that is needed.
The figures below show schedule pressure effects on productivity, quality, and
cumulative uncertainties resolved. The higher productivity but lower quality of
uncertainty resolution results in a higher number of cumulative uncertainties
resolved and significantly delayed project completion. Realistic schedules that
have some flexibility to them are an answer to schedule pressure-related effects.
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Fig A.19: Effect of Schedule Pressure on Productivity
Effect of Schedule Pressure on Productivity
2
1.7
1.4
1.1
0.8
0 24 48 72 96 120 144
Time (Month)
Effect
Effect
of
of
168 192 216 240
Schedule Pressure on Productivity: Base Case - Willing to Slip Dmnl
Schedule Pressure on Productivity: Base Case Dmnl
Fig A.20: Effect of Schedule Pressure on Quality
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Fig A.21: Cumulative Uncertainties Resolved - Willingness to Slip Schedule
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f) Reducing the time taken for staff to gain experience is another lever for reducing
total project completion time. A focus on proper documentation that can be
reviewed by new project staff and devoting the requisite time with new project
staff to bring them up-to-speed is critical to reducing the learning curve effects
that hurt both work productivity and quality.
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Appendix B
The following questionnaire was used to survey 24 project leaders/managers of new
business development projects in a single, large, established firm.
Introduction provided to interviewees: I am working on a Master's thesis (as part of the
SDM program at MIT/Sloan) that is looking at the reason's why large, established firms
find it difficult to pursue non-traditional business opportunities for revenue growth. I
request your help with filling out the following questionnaire based upon your experience
with any specific project that you managed/led that was pursuing revenue growth
through a non-traditional (outside the direction of a Business Unit) business opportunity.
1. Could you please provide an approximate time frame of the last (or most relevant)
growth-related project that you led or managed?
(a) Project is currently active
(b) Project was concluded in the last year
(c) Project was concluded over a year ago but less than 3 years ago
(d) Project was concluded over 3 years ago
2. Could you please list the project name (to ensure that this analysis is not biased by
multiple survey results for the same project)?
Project Name:
3. Could you please provide a summary of the outcome?
(a) Project resulted in a commercial launch
(b) Project entered commercialization but was halted prior to launch
(c) Project was halted prior to the beginning of a commercialization process
(d) Project is in progress
4. What is/was the technical uncertainty in the project?
(a) Inventions are/were required
(b) Inventions are/were not required
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4a. Does/Did the project require capital expenditure of greater than $10 Million to
enable commercial launch?
(a) Yes
(b) No
5. What is/was the alignment with the firm's technical core competencies?
(a) Good alignment (or leverage) with technical core competencies
(b) Some alignment with technical core competencies
(c) Poor alignment with technical core competencies
6. What is/was the market uncertainty in the project?
(a) Customer needs are/were known, distribution and sales channels is/were
known, segmentation is/was possible
(b) Customer needs are/were known, distribution and sales channels are/were
unknown or segmentation is/was not possible
(c) Customer needs are/were unknown, distribution and sales channels
are/were unknown, segmentation is/was not possible
7. What is/was the alignment with the firm's existing markets, sales, and
distribution?
(a) Good alignment with existing markets, sales, and distribution
(b) Some alignment (or leverage) with existing markets, sales, and
distribution
(c) Poor alignment with existing markets, sales, and distribution
8. What is/was the organizational uncertainty in the project (part 1)?
(a) Decisions are/were needed from Senior management more than 2 levels
over your level in the organization hierarchy
(b) Decisions are/were made by the team, by you, or your immediate
management, at the time.
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9. What is/was the organizational uncertainty in the project (part 2)?
Are you familiar with previous projects similar to yours that had succeeded in
getting to commercial product launch?
(a) Yes
(b) No
10. What is/was the alignment with the firm's organizational resources?
(a) Resources (people, money, equipment) are/were made available without
significant difficulty
(b) Resources (people, money, equipment) are/were available but only after
some difficulty
(c) Resources (people, money, equipment) are/were practically unavailable
11. What representation of project team (from the four pictures below) is closest to
the organizational structure you have/had for your project?
Figure key:
Functional Teams: Led by functional managers (no assigned project leader)
Lightweight Teams: Led by Project Manager. Project Team members report to
Functional Managers, not to the Project Manager. Project Team focused primarily
on the Technology.
Heavyweight Teams: Led by Project Manager. Project Team members report to
Project Manager for the duration of the Project. After completion of project, team
members return to Functional Organization. Project Team focused on Technology
and Market (Development through Commercialization).
Autonomous Teams: Led by Project Manager. Project Team members report to
Project Manager and are no longer linked with their prior Functional
Organization. Project Team focused on Technology and Market (Development,
Commercialization through New Business Growth).
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Manager Market
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12. Given the opportunity, would you have preferred a different organizational
structure?
(a) Yes (If Yes, which one - please circle - F, L, H, A
(b) No
13. Did you work closely (from a technical or market perspective) with external
resources, such as a joint development partner firm, the governmental agency, a
university/academic institution, acquisition, corporate venture fimding, etc.?
(a) Yes
(b) No
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14. Did you follow (at a reasonable approximation) one of the Kodak standard
development/commercialization processes (KECP, KMCP, RTDP, iPDP)?
(a) Yes
(b) No
Please answer one of the following open-ended questions, based upon your answer to Q2
in this questionnaire:
15. If you answered (b) or (c) to Q2 (i.e., the project was halted before commercial
launch), what do you think was (were) the main cause(s) of project cancellation?
16. If you answered (d) to Q2 (i.e., the project is ongoing), what do you think are the
main inhibitors to project success (i.e., technical challenges, market-related issues,
organizational issues - a specific answer is highly appreciated)?
17. If you answered (a) to Q2 (i.e., the project went to commercial launch), what do
you think was (were) the main cause(s) of project's success?
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Fig B. 1: Survey Results
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Fig B.2: Survey Results - Technology
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Fig B.3: Survey Results - Market
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Fig B.5: Survey Results - Cumulative
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Survey Results - OrganizationFig B.4:
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